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INTRODUCTION. 
Technological developments in life sciences have revolutionized health 
care, with the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries leading the way 
in job creation and economic growth in the United States.1  Advances in 
information technology have sparked the Internet’s social media platforms, 
transforming the way citizens interact.2  Now, social media has the potential 
to transform the landscape of entrepreneurship in health care by providing 
more capital to currently-overlooked startups through crowdfunding.3 
For instance, in 2010, a medical student at Johns Hopkins University, Dr. 
Jimmy Lin, founded the Rare Genomics Institute (“RGI”) because he was 
devastated as he listened to a colleague explain to a patient’s mother that no 
treatments existed for her child’s rare genetic disease.4  What is unique about 
RGI is that it employs crowdfunding, the raising of small amounts of money 
online from multiple sources, to fund part of its operations.5  Although RGI 
represents a donation-based model of crowdfunding, where there are no 
securities or investors but only donors, its success demonstrates that 
 
 1. For instance, nationwide investment in the human genome project is credited 
with a revolutionizing genomic science, contributing to millions of new jobs and 
hundreds of billions in economic growth. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION 
(BIO), BATTELLE/BIO STATE BIOSCIENCE INDUST. DEV. 2012 2 (June 19, 2012), 
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/v3battelle-bio_2012_industry_development.pdf   
(“$10.4 billion investment in basic sciences during the 1993 to 2010 period drove $796 
billion in economic impact, and created 3.8 million job-years of employment over this 
period.”). 
 2. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 
F.3d 1157, 1176 (9th Cir. 2008) (J. McKeown, concurring in part, dissenting in part) 
(observing the “vast number” of interactive websites like Facebook and Google that 
increasingly allow people to, “[o]n a daily basis, . . . rely on the tools of cyberspace to 
help [them] make, maintain, and rekindle friendships; find places to live, work, eat, and 
travel; exchange views on topics ranging from terrorism to patriotism; and enlighten 
[them]selves on subjects from ‘aardvarks to Zoroastrianism.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002)); see also World Internet Usage and Population 
Statistics, INTERNET WORLD STATS (June 30, 2012), 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (indicating there to be 2.4 billion “Internet 
users” worldwide as of June 2012, representing 34% of the estimated world population). 
 3. See generally David Chase, This Could Change Healthtech Startup Funding 
Forever, FORBES BLOG, (Jul. 8, 2012, 10:27am), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davechase/2012/07/08/this-could-change-healthtech-startup-
funding-forever/ (“MedStartr is like most crowdfunding sites that are non-equity. They 
have plans later to have an equity model once SEC rules are clarified.”).  
 4. E.B. Solomont, Lin’s Rare Genomics: Crowdfunding A Way To A Cure, ST. 
LOUIS BUS. J. (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:00 am), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/print-
edition/2012/08/03/lins-rare-genomics-crowdfunding.html. 
5.  Id.  
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crowdfunding has the power to bring disparate individuals with common 
concerns together through the internet to actually fund an enterprise—in this 
case an organization addressing rare genetic disorders.6 
Although some patient-focused innovations have emerged, such as 
smartphone applications for heart rate monitoring and microscopic computer 
chips for measuring athletic performance,7 the decentralization of the 
Internet has been slow to organically deliver more consumer-driven, low-
cost innovations in the health care industry.8  Companies such as Google 
have tried to introduce a consumer-based model for storing personal medical 
records,9 but really it took Congressional action to begin the mass 
integration of electronic medical records.10 
The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”),11 signed by 
President Barack Obama on April 5, 2012, is intended to harness the internet 
 
 6.  Interview with Dr. Jonathan Franca-Koh on Rare Genomics Institute’s Use of a 
Grass Roots Approach to Raise Funds for Patients (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2fmY1EDT2P0 (explaining that there is a “very large 
group of people affected by rare diseases because, although each particular rare disease 
affects few people, there are so many of them that the population is actually very great,” 
but that “the resources made available to these communities is a lot less,” thus providing 
the incentive and opportunity for RGI to use grassroots fundraising like crowdfunding).    
 7. See Adam Sege, Monitoring Your Body, Unobtrusively: New Flexible Sensors on 
Skin Yield Crucial Data: Chips Check Routine Things Like Hydration, Threats Like 
Concussion, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 31, 2012, at B.5, available at 
http://bostonglobe.com/business/2012/12/31/body-sensors-from-cambridge-firm-poised-
for-market/ERVhzpkBHtQy9MO2eS1PgI/story.html. 
 8. See Kathleen Sebelius, The New Momentum Behind Electronic Health Records, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Columns/2010/August/082610Sebelius.aspx  (“Today, 
in almost every other sector besides health, electronic information exchange is the way 
we do business. . . . [D]espite the clear benefits of health IT, only two in ten doctors and 
one in ten hospitals use even a basic electronic record system. . . .  Over the last 30 years, 
we’ve watched information technology revolutionize industry after industry, dramatically 
improving the customer experience and driving down costs.”) (emphasis added). 
 9. Aaron Brown & Bill Weihl, An Update On Google Health And Google 
PowerMeter, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (last updated Jul. 15, 2011), 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/update-on-google-health-and-google.html. 
 10. The Recovery Act, not private industry, was the major catalyst for the 
development of electronic medical records. See Fred Schulte, Stimulus Fuels Gold Rush 
For Electronic Health Systems, HUFFINGTON POST, (last updated May 25, 2011, 3:35pm), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/05/stimulus-fuels-gold-rush_n_347311.html  
(“The government’s $45 billion plan to jump-start a national shift to electronic medical 
records has touched off a gold rush.”). 
 11. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat 306, 315-23 (2012) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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to modernize small business capital formation.12  This Comment posits that 
the subsection of the JOBS Act concerning crowdfunding could have a 
transformative impact on the financing of health care startups, particularly 
emerging biotechnology companies.13  Title III of the JOBS Act 
(“CROWDFUND Act” or “Title III”)14 legalized equity-based crowdfunding 
by establishing a new exception under federal securities laws.  On October 
23, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or 
“Commission”) voted unanimously to propose a set of crowdfunding rules 
(hereinafter “Proposed Crowdfunding Rule”),15 with a public comment 
period ending on February 3, 2014.16 
The CROWDFUND Act permits the online sale of securities to an 
unlimited number of investors (i.e. a large “crowd”) in small amounts using 
the power of social media.17  The CROWDFUND Act permits entrepreneurs 
to raise up to $1 million in capital through “funding portals” (or 
 
 12. President Obama’s Remarks on Signing the JOBS Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2012), reprinted in 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. S4 (“[F]or start-ups and small 
businesses, this bill is a potential game changer. . . . For the first time, ordinary 
Americans will be able to go online and invest in entrepreneurs that they believe in.”). 
 13. Chase, supra note 4 (“With the need to reinvent health care and the challenge to 
getting a startup off the ground in the health care industry, [healthcare crowdfunding 
website] MedStartr seeks to fill an important market gap. By no means will it replace 
venture capital, but it can get more companies to that stage of their company’s 
development.”); see also Mari Serebrov, Senate Adds Investor Protection for 
Crowdfunding to JOBS Act, BIO WORLD TODAY (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.bioworld.com/content/senate-adds-investor-protection-crowd-funding-jobs-
act-0 (“The reforms that make up the JOBS Act are especially important to biotechs that 
are forced to spend investor dollars on compliance when they don’t yet have product 
revenue, said Jim Greenwood, president and CEO of the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization.”). 
 14. CROWDFUND is short for the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud 
and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012.  JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, §§ 301-
305, 126 Stat. 306, 315-23 (2012). 
 15. Press Release, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, SEC Issues Proposal on Crowdfunding (Oct. 
23, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540017677#.Unw1bfkq
iJE [hereinafter SEC Issues Proposal].  
 16. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 (Nov. 
5, 2013) (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249); see also infra Part 
V.B. 
 17. See C. Steven Bradford, The New Federal Crowdfunding Exemption: Promise 
Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L. J. 195, 196 (2012) [hereinafter Promise Unfulfilled] 
(discussing the JOBS Act and describing crowdfunding, as when “[a]n entrepreneur, or 
anyone else who needs money, publishes an appeal for funds on a publicly accessible 
web site, and that appeal is communicated to the general public through the site.”). 
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intermediaries)18 by offering and selling securities over the Internet, without 
triggering the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 (“the 
1933 Act”).19   The CROWDFUND Act attempts to harness the Internet and 
social media to boost capital-raising prospects for small issuers.20  To 
accomplish this goal, Congress significantly altered decades-old federal 
securities laws,21 and after some initial delay,22 on October 23, 2013 the 
Commission unanimously voted to propose eagerly-anticipated 
crowdfunding rules.23 
Before the adoption of the JOBS Act, the 1933 Act prohibited companies 
from selling securities online in this fashion.24  For example, intermediary 
websites intending to host a startup company’s offering of securities could 
 
 18. “Funding portals” are a new type of regulated entity created by the 
CROWDFUND Act and are essentially the websites empowered to host the offering of 
securities by the crowdfunding issuers online.  See JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 
302(a), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C) (2012)) (requiring “funding portal” to 
comply with certain conditions for exemption to be effective); see also Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(80), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 304(b), 126 Stat. 
306, 322 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80) (2012) (defining funding portal).  
“Issuer” is defined infra, note 20. 
 19. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)) (establishing an exemption from registration requirements of the 
Section 5 of the 1933 Act). 
 20. An “issuer” is defined in the 1933 Act as “every person who issues or proposes 
to issue any security.”  Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(4), (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
77b(a)(4)).  Once an issuer’s offering or sale of securities implicates registration 
requirements under the federal securities laws, the issuer becomes subject to civil and 
criminal liability for noncompliance or materially false misstatements in various required 
disclosures.  See, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12, 17, 24 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). For this and other reasons, it is desirable for smaller 
issuers to find ways to avoid triggering the registration requirements of the 1933 Act. 
 21. JOBS Act, Pub. L. 112-106, §§ 302-306, 126 Stat. 315-323 (2012) (enacting 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77d-1 and enacting and amending 15 U.S.C §§ 77d, 77r, 78c, 78l, and 78o); 
JOBS Act Significantly Alters Federal Securities Laws, BALLARD SPAHR LLP (Apr. 6, 
2012), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legalalerts/2012-04-
06_jobs_act_significantly_alters_federal_securities_laws.aspx. 
 22. J.D. Harrison, Deadline Approaching For Crowdfunding Regulators, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 19, 2012, at A09, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-
small-business/as-deadline-approaches-regulators-face-mounting-concerns-over-
crowdfunding-rules/2012/11/16/fb3f1e02-3031-11e2-ac4a-33b8b41fb531_story.html 
(pointing out that the JOBS Act set a deadline of December 31, 2012 for the SEC to 
adopt crowdfunding  rules, and the self-regulatory body for broker-dealers, the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), is also required to draft rules—but with no 
corresponding deadline). 
 23. SEC Issues Proposal, supra note 15.  
 24. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 249 (pointing out “formidable 
obstacles under federal securities laws” to crowdfunding). 
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be required to register as brokers,25 investment advisors, or both.26  
Additionally, the startups, known in securities and corporate law as 
“issuers,” soliciting investors for crowdfunding investments would 
themselves be required to register such securities offerings with the SEC,27 
which can be burdensome and costly.28  To grease the wheels of commerce, 
the CROWDFUND Act created a new exemption from these requirements 
just for crowdfunding, which could potentially fill a critical capital gap 
among startups in the health care industry.29 
Due to the passage of Title III, startups like Dr. Lin’s Rare Genomics 
Institute can utilize social media not merely to solicit donations from 
sympathetic strangers, but to actually offer strangers an equity stake in his 
growing business.  Individuals scattered throughout the country that share 
medical concerns30 or that occupy similar roles in the health care system 
(e.g. nurses, doctors) could be united through social media and attracted to 
innovative solutions in the industry.  This Comment considers the potential 
impact that the CROWDFUND Act could have on startup financing for 
emerging biotech companies, and assesses the appropriate level of 
supervision of this emerging industry by the SEC, in particular regarding the 
statutory investment limits. 
 
 25. Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines “broker” as 
any intermediary “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the 
account of others.”  15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (2012). 
 26. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 196 (“[C]rowdfunding web sites 
hosting offerings of securities could be required to register as brokers under the Securities 
Exchange Act or as investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act.”). 
 27. Absent an exemption, it is unlawful to sell securities unless a registration 
statement is in effect as to those securities.  Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 
77e(a)(1) (2012). 
 28. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding Or Fraudfunding? Social Networks And The 
Securities Laws—Why The Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be Conditioned On 
Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1744 (2012) (describing the registration of 
securities as “an expensive and otherwise burdensome process that presents barriers to 
small businesses’ access to the U.S. capital markets.”). 
 29. Timothy Hay, MedStartr Thinks Crowdfunding Will Work For Med-Tech, WALL 
ST. J. BLOG, (Jun. 26, 2012, 1:16pm), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2012/06/26/medstartr-thinks-crowdfunding-will-
work-for-med-tech/. 
 30. Larry Gerrans, Sanovas Remarks on “How Crowdfunding Affects the Healthcare 
Market, and Your Wallet”, SANOVAS CO. NEWS, 
http://www.sanovas.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=928:sanovas
-remarks-on-qhow-crowdfunding-affects-the-healthcare-market-and-your-
walletq&catid=46:company&Itemid=58 (arguing that “[w]ith social media as the driver, 
communities and industries can invest in their collective interest. The Life Science 
community is especially well suited to answer this call. . . . Sentimentally, Crowdfunding 
presents the entrepreneur with an incredibly meaningful socioeconomic mandate.”). 
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Section I of this Comment introduces the prohibitions of the Securities 
Act of 1933,31 its exemptions,32 and emphasizes the significance of the 
common law interpretation that the primary purpose of federal securities law 
is investor protection.33  Section I also details how the JOBS Act’s new 
registration exemption altered federal securities laws, and how the 
exemption is likely to impact the development of Internet-based 
crowdfunding for startups.  Section II briefly summarizes the legislative 
history of the JOBS Act.  Section III posits that crowdfunding presents a 
valuable capital-raising strategy for biotech startups.  Section IV warns that 
investors, intermediaries, and especially biotech startup companies should be 
worried about fraudsters exploiting the crowdfunding space.  Section V 
outlines the self-certification standard, whereby intermediaries are able to 
rely on investors’ assurances concerning their income and investments in 
other crowdfunding ventures,34 and discusses the advantages and 
disadvantages of the Proposed Crowdfunding Rule.  The conclusion 
emphasizes the need for meaningful enforcement of the investment limits in 
the CROWDFUND Act for a stable crowdfunding industry, preferably with 
the use of third party verification services overseen by the SEC or the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). 
I. THE NEW ROLE OF CROWDFUNDING IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW. 
A. The Exemptions to Securities Act Registration. 
The Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act” or “Securities Act”) was passed 
with the intention of protecting the investing public from fraud.35  It requires 
any offering of securities36 to be registered with the SEC, unless an 
 
 31. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2012). 
 32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77d. 
 33. See infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 34. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,469-66,470. 
 35. At the time, President Franklin D. Roosevelt regarded the law’s passage as a shift 
towards consumer protection.  Hazen, supra note 26 (citing Message to Congress from 
President Franklin Roosevelt (Mar. 29, 1933), quoted in H.R. Rep. No. 73-85, 73rd Cong. 
(1933) (“This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine, ‘let 
the seller also beware.’ It puts the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller.  It 
should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring back public 
confidence.”)). 
 36. The 1933 Act lists various financial products in its definition of a “security,” 
which includes most forms of stock and notes. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77b(a)(1) (2012).It also includes any “investment contract,” which courts have defined 
as any “transaction or scheme” involving an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with the expectation of profits based primarily on the efforts of others. SEC v. 
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99, (1946); see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. 
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exemption is available,37 and imposes liability for fraud involved in such 
selling efforts.38  Since the text states that “it shall be unlawful for any 
person, directly or indirectly” to offer to buy or sell securities unless a 
registration statement has been filed with the SEC,39 it is the 1933 Act’s 
exemptions that shape the contours of federal securities regulation.  One 
principal exemption is found in Section 4(1), which exempts transactions by 
any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.40  Other provisions 
involve exempting certain securities and intrastate offerings.41 
Judicial interpretations of section 4(2)’s “private placement” exemption 
reveal the courts’ generally expansive view of the scope of the 1933 Act’s 
protections.  The Supreme Court, in Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ralston Purina 
Co.,42 articulated the legislative intent of Congress in passing the 1933 Act, 
saying the intent was to protect investors who are not otherwise “able to fend 
for themselves” in public markets.43  In subsequent cases where issuers tried 
to avoid registration requirements by claiming a private placement 
exemption,44 lower courts looked to the investor’s financial sophistication 
and measured the extent to which the investor had access to information 
 
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 860 (1975); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 
482 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 37. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §77e(c) (2012). 
 38. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a)(1), 12(a)(2), 15, 17, 24 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. § 77). 
 39. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §77e(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 40. The Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(1) (2012).  “Dealer” is 
defined in § 2(a)(12)  as “any person who engages . . . in the business of . . . dealing or 
trading in securities.”  “Underwriter” is defined expansively  in § 2(a)(11)  to include 
“any person . . . who offers or sells for an issuer in connection with  . . . a distribution of 
any security,” any purchaser “with a view to . . . the distribution of any security,” or 
anyone who participates in any such undertaking.   
 41. See, e.g., the Securities Act of 1933 Act § 3(a)(2). 
 42. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
 43. Id. at 124-25.  The SEC filed suit against Ralston Purina, disputing the 
company’s policy of selling common stock to hundreds of key employees without 
registration.  The defendant argued that such offers were exempt from securities laws 
because they constituted private placements under what is now § 4(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act.  The Court disagreed, holding that the registration exemptions ought to be 
viewed in light of the legislative intent of the Act, which is to promote full disclosure of 
company information so that investors can make informed decisions.  The Court declared 
that non-executive personnel, such as the company’s chow loading foreman and stock 
clerk, were entitled “to have access to the kind of information which registration would 
disclose.” Id. at 127. 
 44. Section 4(2) exempts transactions by an issuer “not involving any public 
offering,” also known as a private placement.  Among the exemptions for private 
placements are Regulation D offerings. The Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 
77d(a)(2). 
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adequate enough to make an informed investment decision.45  Thus, unless 
an issuer can demonstrate46 that a purchaser was sophisticated and had 
adequate access to information about the issuer, whether through disclosures 
made prior to the securities transaction or by virtue of his relationship to the 
issuer, the private placement exemption will not be available.47 
Courts have since varied in their approach to the relative weight given to 
this bifurcated information-sophistication test,48 thus leading to uncertainty 
among issuers.49  In response, the SEC adopted Regulation D (“Reg. D”),50 a 
set of rules providing a reliable safe harbor to ensure a private placement 
 
 45. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(establishing that even sophisticated parties require information in order for the issuer to 
enjoy a private placement exemption); see also SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 
F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1975) (denying the availability of a § 4(2) exemption where investors 
had adequate access to information but were unsophisticated). 
 46. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953) (“Keeping in mind the 
broadly remedial purposes of federal securities legislation, imposition of the burden of 
proof on an issuer who would plead the exemption seems to us fair and reasonable.”). 
 47. For example, issuers are liable to purchasers for violating § 5 of the 1933 Act and 
a purchaser/investor is entitled under § 12(a)(1) to seek rescission of such transactions. 
 48. See, e.g., SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(“Courts applying [the Ralston Purina] mandate have identified various factors that 
should be considered in determining whether an offering is exempt under section 4(a): 
the number of offerees, the relationship of the offerees to each other and the issuer, the 
manner of the offering, information disclosure or access, and the sophistication of the 
offerees.”). 
 49. E.g., compare Doran, 545 F.2d at 906-08 (focusing on quality of disclosure by 
the issuer and the level of investor access to information in assessing propriety of a §4(2) 
exemption) (emphasis added), with Lively v. Hirschfield, 440 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 
1971) (arguing for “strict” interpretation of Ralston Purina where a private placement 
exists for “only persons of exceptional business experience” with regular access to all the 
relevant information); see also John Coffee, Jr. and Hillary A. Sale, SECURITIES 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 347-48 (12th ed. 2012), (comparing Lively’s focus 
on a “seemingly higher standard” of investor sophistication for a private placement 
exemption with Doran’s “focus more on the quality of the disclosure provided by the 
issuer.”). 
 50. The SEC may, “by its rules and regulations” exempt certain securities from 
registration requirements if it finds that “enforcement . . . with respect to such securities 
is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the 
small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering,” which shall not 
exceed $5 million.  Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012).  The 
Commission has used this authority broadly.  C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the 
Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 87 (2012) [hereinafter 
Crowdfunding] (pointing out that, even before passage of the JOBS Act, the SEC “clearly 
ha[d] the authority to exempt crowdfunding from the registration requirements of the 
Securities Act and to exempt crowdfunding web sites from registration as brokers or 
investment advisers” under section 3(b) and section 28). 
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exemption if certain conditions are met.51  For smaller issuers in particular, 
including the type of entrepreneurs who may be interested in crowdfunding, 
Reg. D has become a popular alternative to risking the uncertainty involved 
in a judicial or SEC administrative proceeding featuring discussions of the 
sophistication of a purchaser.52  Although Reg. D simplified the private 
placement pathway, it is worth noting that Ralston Purina is by no means 
antiquated, and endures as a guidepost for determining whether an issuer can 
properly claim a private placement exemption under the statute.  Ralston 
Purina also serves as a useful backdrop against which to measure other 
exemptions and rules: “[t]he focus of inquiry should be on the need of 
[investors] for the protections afforded by registration.”53  This basic 
proposition of securities law should be kept in mind as the SEC continues to 
draft the rules for a new crowdfunding exemption. 
B. Debt and Equity Crowdfunding. 
Crowdfunding refers generally to the raising of funds online in small 
amounts from a large group of people.54  It is a phenomenon purely of the 
Internet-age, but its roots are derived from crowdsourcing and micro-
finance.55  Crowdsourcing is the pooling together of resources around a 
common goal,56 while micro-finance, or micro-lending, refers to targeted 
lending in small amounts to borrowers, who are often in poorer, 
undercapitalized regions abroad.57  Modern crowdfunding can be 
categorized into five types, “distinguished by what investors are promised in 
return for their contributions: (1) the donation model; (2) the reward model; 
(3) the pre-purchase model; (4) the lending model; and (5) the equity 
model.”58  Prior to the JOBS Act, and without any action by Congress or the 
SEC, companies could validly raise funds using crowdfunding by selecting 
 
 51. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-508 (2013). 
 52. VLAD IVANOV AND SCOTT BAUGUESS, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN 
THE U.S.: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D 
EXEMPTION (Feb. 2012), http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec103111_analysis-
reg-d-offering.pdf. 
 53. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 127 (1953). 
 54. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 5. 
 55. Id. at 27-28. 
 56. Id. (describing examples such as the Internet-based encyclopedia Wikipedia, 
open-sourced operating system Linux, and Google, “which captures the sites that 
everyone collectively is linking to and visiting.”). 
 57. Id. at 28-29. (explaining how micro-lending has ballooned from its modern 
origins as one $27 investment in Bangladesh to a multi-billion industry). 
 58. Id. at 14. For a detailed account of these different approaches to crowdfunding, 
their respective prevalence, and which types most obviously run afoul of federal 
securities laws, see Professor Bradford’s comprehensive discussion. Id. at 14-42. 
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only some of these techniques— issuing securities (i.e. the equity model) 
was forbidden.59  For instance, various websites like Kickstarter60 and 
Indiegogo,61 already charge entrepreneurs fees for hosting an offering of 
“perks” or rewards in exchange for contributions from an online universe.62  
However, because these sites are hosting enterprises that only seek 
donations63 or give out products to contributors, such as an audio CD 
produced by an artist, federal securities law are not implicated.64 
In fact, Congressional action technically may not have been necessary to 
permit equity and debt investments (securities transactions) because the SEC 
already has the authority to exempt such transactions.65  However, before the 
JOBS Act, it was uncommon in the U.S. for companies to even appear to be 
offering a stake in their enterprise in exchange for investments from online 
users because the SEC had not explicitly exempted such transactions, and 
the penalty of unwittingly triggering securities regulation can be costly.66  
 
 59. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 196-97. 
 60. KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2013). 
 61. INDIEGOGO: AN INTERNATIONAL CROWDFUNDING PLATFORM TO RAISE MONEY, 
http://www.indiegogo.com/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2013). 
 62. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 16-20. 
 63. See, e.g., Brett Zongker, Crowd-Funding Draws Donations for Sandy Relief, 
BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 22, 2012), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/12/23/crowd-funding-draws-donations-
for-sandy-relief/ojJjmbsJ1ou8rdXKdi7Z5H/story.html (“While Congress considers a $60 
billion disaster aid package for the storm victims, hundreds of them have gotten quicker 
results by creating personalized fundraising campaigns on sites including GoFundMe, 
IndieGoGo and HelpersUnite.”). 
 64. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 15-26 at 31-32.  (observing that 
consuming a product is not indicative of investment contract and that “contributors to 
donation-model sites are offered nothing else, such as stock or notes, that would fall 
within the general definition of a security”) (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 
U.S. 681 (1985); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990)); see also supra, note 36 
(discussing the Howey test and definition of an investment contract). 
 65. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. §77c(b)(1) (2012) (allowing the SEC 
to exempt “any class of securities” if it finds that enforcement “is not necessary in the 
public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved 
or the limited character of the public offering,” the aggregate offering amount of which is 
not to exceed $5 million); see also id. § 28, 15 U.S.C. 77z-3 (stating the SEC “by rule or 
regulation, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person, security, or 
transaction . . . from any provision or provisions of this subchapter or of any rule or 
regulation issued under this subchapter, to the extent that such exemption is necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors.”).   
 66. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 24 (citing “regulatory issues” raised 
by equity-based crowdfunding for its unpopularity in the U.S.). 
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One case demonstrates how, prior to the passage of the JOBS Act, two 
unsuspecting executives ran afoul of federal securities regulation.67 
In November of 2009, two advertising executives agreed to a cease-and-
desist order from the SEC for failing to register a securities offering with the 
SEC.68   They started a website called BuyBeerCompany.com, purportedly 
to purchase Pabst Blue Ribbon for $300 million, and promoted the website 
over Facebook and Twitter, ultimately attracting $200 million in pledges 
from five million individuals online.69  Although the executives’ attorney 
said they were only experimenting with crowdsourcing and did not expect 
such a response, the SEC was not amused.   The Commission found that, 
although “[n]o monies were ever collected,” this solicitation of investments 
over social media, in exchange for a “crowdsourced certificate of 
ownership” (as well as beer), on the premise of acquiring Pabst Blue 
Ribbon, constituted an offer of securities that “was not registered with the 
Commission, nor exempt from registration,” and thus in violation of section 
5(c) of the 1933 Act.70  This high-profile case was later credited with 
sparking a Congressional hearing on crowdfunding.71 
The CROWDFUND Act has provided a pathway for the sort of 
fundraising contemplated by the Pabst campaign, because it added section 
4(a)(6) to the 1933 Securities Act, exempting all transactions where offers 
and sales of securities are made through crowdfunding portals online from 
the section 5(c) registration requirement.72  However, it is worth noting that 
the statute would not necessarily have paved the way for the $300 million 
acquisition of Pabst because of the $1 million cap. 
 
 67. Chad Bray, Huge Beer Run Halted by Those No Fun D.C. Regulators, WALL. ST. 
J. BLOG (June 8, 2011, 4:05 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/06/08/huge-beer-run-
halted-by-those-no-fun-d-c-regulators/ (outlining that “Steven Berkowitz, [the 
defendants’] lawyer, said the duo simply wanted to conduct an experiment online in 
crowdsourcing and saw that Pabst was for sale at the time.”). 
 68. See Michael Migliozzi II, Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings 
Pursuant to section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a 
Cease-and-Desist Order, Securities Act Release No. 9216 (June 8, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2011/33-9216.pdf. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2-3. 
 71. Andrew Ackerman, Fizzled Beer Deal Prompts ‘Crowd-Funding’ Hearing, 
WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2011, 3:53 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903927204576570614068591324.html. 
 72. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6), JOBS Act. 
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C. Reg. D and Small Offering Exemptions. 
The SEC may already have had the authority to exempt crowdfunding 
transactions under section 3(b) of the 1933 Act, which grants broad authority 
to the SEC to exempt from registration certain securities purchases where 
the Commission deems it “not necessary in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors by reason of the small amount involved or the limited 
character of the public offering.”73  After all, the SEC’s mission is not only 
to protect investors and maintain orderly markets, but to facilitate capital 
formation.74  To this end, in the 1980s the SEC acted on its section 3(b) 
authority to create rules fulfilling part of the purpose behind today’s 
crowdfunding exemption.  As a result, in 1982 the SEC adopted Rules 501-
508 to form Regulation D (“Reg. D”), which provides several safe harbors 
for the private offering exemption under section 4(2) of the Securities Act.75 
Reg. D offerings are the dominant capital raising strategy among private 
offerings, and Rule 506 is the most popular.76  Rule 506 is the most 
prevalent capital-raising strategy under Reg. D because it permits companies 
to sell an unlimited dollar amount of securities to accredited investors and up 
to thirty-five non-accredited investors, so long as the issuer reasonably 
believes that those purchasers have “such knowledge and experience in 
financial and business matters that [they are] capable of evaluating the 
merits and risks of the prospective investment.”77  Rule 504 and 505 
offerings are capped at $1 million and $5 million, respectively, and Rule 505 
is limited to thirty-five or fewer “nonaccredited investors.”78  An accredited 
investor includes any individual with an income above $200,000 (or 
$300,000 along with a spouse), most banks, businesses, upper-level 
management of the issuer; and individuals with a net worth exceeding 
$1,000,000.79  Importantly, the valuation of net worth excludes one’s 
primary residence, 80 so as not to be over-inclusive. 
 
 73. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2012); see also supra 
note 65. 
 74. FY14 CFTC, SEC Budget Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Services 
and General Government of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(testimony of Mary Jo White, Chairman, SEC) (remarking on the SEC’s “three-part 
mission: to protect investors, maintain . . . efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.”).  
 75. Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving 
Limited Offers and Sales, 47 Fed Reg. 11,251, 11,258 (proposed Mar. 16, 1982). 
 76. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 52.   
 77. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2012). 
 78. Id.  § 230.505. 
 79. Id. § 230.501(a)(1-8). 
 80. Id, § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(A) 
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Under Rule 506, issuers are permitted to sell an unlimited number of 
securities to accredited investors because those investors are deemed 
financially sophisticated enough to comprehend the risks involved in the 
investment.81  To protect investors and the public broadly, limitations are in 
place regarding the manner in which securities are issued under Reg. D.  For 
example, under Rules 505 and 506, resale limitations are put in place.82  
Further, issuers and others are prohibited from engaging in “general 
solicitation or general advertising” through newspapers, magazines, TV, or 
radio advertisements,83 unless all of the purchasers are accredited 
investors.84 
Reg. D is therefore important to understand for several reasons.  As 
discussed above, Reg. D plays a dominant role in the recent trend of private 
placements eclipsing public offerings, suggesting that offerings made under 
the crowdfunding exemption could benefit from this market appetite for 
nonpublic offerings.  Further, as discussed in greater detail below: (1) 
crowdfunding may compete with Reg. D as a capital formation strategy 
among life science and biotech startups; (2) some issuers may seek to 
combine these capital-raising strategies, raising novel regulatory issues for 
the SEC; and (3) the JOBS Act’s repeal of the general advertising ban, and 
the SEC’s recent rule implementing its repeal, may indicate the direction the 
SEC will take on other JOBS Act rulemakings. 
1. Filling a Critical Capital Gap for Small Issuers. 
Reg. D provides a significant and reliable safe harbor from registration 
requirements for small issuers, and accordingly, this has proven to be a 
popular route for small businesses wishing to avoid the costs of registration 
and provides an important capital formation function.85  The primary policy 
goal of Reg. D offerings was to facilitate capital formation for small 
businesses.86  The SEC staff has since observed a recent trend where the 
amount of capital raised in private placements (i.e. nonpublic offerings), 
 
 81. Id.  § 230.501(e)(1)(iv) (excluding accredited investors from inclusion in § 
230.506(b)(2)(ii)).  See also supra, notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing policy 
rationale for Reg. D’s Rule 506). 
 82. Id. §§ 230.505(b)(1), 506(b)(1) (requiring that “offers and sales must satisfy” the 
terms of §§ 230.501 and 230.502). 
 83. 17 C.F.R. §230.502(c) (2012) (prohibiting the offering and selling of securities in 
Reg. D offerings “by any form of general solicitation or general advertising,” except as 
provided in § 230.504(b)(1)). 
 84. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2012); see also 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (Jul. 24, 2013). 
 85. IVANOV & BAUGUESS, supra note 52. 
 86. Id. at 1 (referring to “the original regulatory objective to target the capital 
formation needs of small business”). 
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such as those through Reg. D, has actually eclipsed the capital raised in 
publicly registered offerings.87  The amount of capital raised privately 
surpassed public offering amounts in 2010 and 2011 by, respectively, 8% 
(an estimated $1.16 trillion compared to $1.07 trillion) and 3%.88 
This trend accelerated dramatically in 2012, with private offerings 
eclipsing public ones by 42%,89 which underscores the increasing 
importance of registration exceptions aimed at small business, in particular 
Reg. D.90  Further, the SEC estimates that there were 37,000 Reg. D 
offerings initiated between 2009 and 2011 with a median offering price of 
$1 million, surpassing $900 billion worth of securities sold in 2010.91 
However, even as Reg. D offerings and other private placements are 
surging, there are reports of severe capital shortages among small businesses 
from the last four years.92  Now that non-equity based crowdfunding has 
reached a certain height in popularity, the hope among crowdfunding 
advocates is that small issuers may choose Title III over Reg. D offerings, 
depending on the success of the SEC crowdfunding rule.  Estimates find that 
as many as 19% of small business owners would pursue equity investments 
via a crowdfunding exemption to fill the void.93  One crowdfunding service 
provider used these figures to estimate a potential market of 700,000 
companies that could be soliciting investments through online funding 
 
 87. Id. at 3. 
 88. Id.  
 89. VLAD IVANOV & SCOTT BAUGUESS, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE 
U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF UNREGISTERED OFFERINGS USING THE REGULATION D EXEMPTION, 
2009-2012, AN UPDATE TO THE FEB. 2012 STUDY 8 (2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/whitepapers/dera-unregistered-offerings-reg-d.pdf 
(“In 2012, registered offerings accounted for $1.2 trillion of new capital compared to $1.7 
trillion raised through all private offering channels.”). 
 90. Id. at 5. 
 91. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r of the Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Public Statement on 
Investor Protection is Needed for True Capital Formation: Views on the JOBS Act, (Mar. 
16, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch031612laa.htm#P41_18027. 
 92. THE NAT’L SMALL BUS. ASS’N, Forward to SMALL BUSINESS ACCESS TO CAPITAL 
SURVEY (July 11, 2012), http://www.nsba.biz/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Access-to-
Capital-Survey.pdf (“According to the survey, nearly half (43 percent) of small-business 
respondents said that, in the last four years, they needed funds and were  unable to find 
any willing sources, be it loans, credit cards or investors.”). 
 93. Id. at 10; but see MICHAEL T. RAVE, ET. AL., DAY PITNEY LLP, JOBS ACT—ON 
REGULATION A, REGULATION D AND CROWDFUNDING PROVISIONS 5 (Apr. 19, 2012), 
http://www.daypitney.com/news/docs/dp_4117.pdf (predicting the opposite will occur, 
“relegating crowdfunding to the realm of companies that are unable to get the backing of 
professional investors”). 
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portals by the third year of crowdfunding.94  This may be an optimistic 
assessment; estimates of the state of growth and size of the crowdfunding 
industry vary widely,95 and predictions vary according to the assumptions 
made about growth and the veracity of the underlying data.96  However, 
these trends in the growth of private placements may suggest, at the very 
least, a healthy appetite for alternative capital-raising strategies among small 
firms seeking to avoid SEC registration. 
2. SEC Proposed to Allow Concurrent Crowdfunding and Reg. D. 
Offerings. 
One thing that may satisfy some of the critical funding gaps outlined 
above is the SEC’s proposal to allow issuers to fundraise using both a 
crowdfunding 4(a)(6) and Reg. D. exemption simultaneously.  For instance, 
one major question following passage of the JOBS Act was whether an 
issuer would be able to take advantage of new lax advertising rules 
mandated under Title II to attract accredited investors, while simultaneously 
employing the crowdfunding exemption under Title III to attract 
unaccredited investors.97   The SEC’s proposed crowdfunding rule98 cleared 
 
 94. Brian Knight, Dir. of Entrepreneur Servs., Crowdcheck, Letter to SEC and 
Comment on Regulatory Initiatives Under the JOBS Act: Title III—Crowdfunding (Dec. 
5, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-185.htm. 
 95. See Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 196 (describing 
crowdfunding as growing into “a billion-dollar industry”) (citing Natalie Huet, European 
Start-Ups Court Crowds for Cash, REUTERS (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/09/finance-crowdfunding-
idUSL5E8G50RB20120509); see also THE ECONOMIST, The New Thundering Herd, 
Wanted: Small Sums Of Money To Finance Young Companies (June 16, 2012), available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/21556973 (claiming “[c]rowdfunding is booming. . . . 
[according to a] report by Massolution, a research firm, forecast[ing] that $2.8 billion will 
be raised worldwide this year, up from $1.5 billion in 2011 and only $530m in 2009.”); 
see also Roger Yu, Crowd Funding Fuels Businesses, Charities, Creative Ventures, USA 
TODAY (May 31, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-
05-29/crowd-funding-websites/55288516/1 (citing “a report by Crowdsourcing.org,” an 
industry group, to claim “[a]bout $1.5 billion was raised in 2011 by about 450 crowd-
sourcing Internet sites worldwide”); but see Felix Salmon, Annals Of Dubious Statistics, 
Crowdfunding Edition, REUTERS (July 27, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2012/07/27/annals-of-dubious-statistics-crowdfunding-edition/ (questioning 
billion-dollar estimates). 
 96. Knight, supra note 94 (conceding that “there is a very limited amount of 
information available, and what information exists is often widely divergent”). 
 97. Chris Tyrrell, et al., CrowdFund Intermediary Regulatory Advocates (“CFIRA”) 
Letter to SEC and Comment on SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III, at  
1-2. (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-169.pdf 
[hereinafter CFIRA Comment Letter] (calling it “unclear how the SEC’s historical 
integration criteria are implicated by the crowdfunding and Regulation D reforms of the 
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up this question, proposing to allow other exempt offerings concurrently 
alongside a crowdfunding-exempt offering by saying the Staff will not 
consider the two offerings “integrated.”99  Generally speaking, the SEC’s 
integration doctrine prevents an issuer from doing indirectly what it is 
prohibited from doing directly.100  It is designed to disallow issuers from 
piling exemption on exemption to circumvent the rules. However, in part 
because of the $1 million cap on crowdfunding issuers, the SEC stated: 
[W]e believe that an offering made in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) 
should not be integrated with another exempt offering made by the 
issuer, provided that each offering complies with the requirements 
of the applicable exemption that is being relied upon for the 
particular offering. An issuer could complete an offering made in 
reliance on Section 4(a)(6) that occurs simultaneously with, or is 
preceded or followed by, another exempt offering.101 
This proposal is particularly meaningful for issuers wishing to generally 
solicit accredited investors but who also want to seek crowdfunding 
investors.  Title II of the JOBS Act directed the SEC to lift the ban on 
general solicitation and advertising of securities in smaller offerings.102  
There were two important qualifications to the statutory exemption: all 
purchasers of the securities must be accredited investors,103 and the issuer 
“[must] take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are 
accredited investors.”104  Congress thus mandated in the JOBS Act that the 
SEC permit the general solicitation and advertising of securities, previously 
 
JOBS Act,” questioning “whether an issuer can conduct crowdfunded offerings 
concurrently with offerings under other exemptions, such as Regulation D,” and asserting 
“it is unclear whether integration will be applied to crowdfunded offerings at all”). 
 98. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 
(proposed Nov. 5, 2013) (amending 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232, 239, 240 and 249), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-11-05/pdf/2013-25355.pdf.  
 99. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,431. 
 100. 78 Fed. Reg. 66,431, at n.27 (“The integration doctrine seeks to prevent an issuer 
from improperly avoiding registration by artificially dividing a single offering into 
multiple offerings such that Securities Act exemptions would apply to multiple offerings 
that would not be available for the combined offering.”). 
 101. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,432. 
 102. The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1) (mandating the SEC to amend its regulations “to 
provide that the prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising contained 
in § 230.502(c) of such title shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant 
to § 230.506, provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors.”). 
 103. As defined by Securities Act Rule 501(a).  The term accredited investor includes 
most banks, businesses, upper-level management of the issuer, and individuals with a net 
worth over $1,000,000.  17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1-8). 
 104. The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1).  See infra notes 131-36 (listing the qualifying 
“reasonable steps” adopted in the final rule). 
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banned on, for instance, TV, the Internet, or newspapers,105 so long as the 
ultimate purchasers are accredited investors.106 
After an initial rule proposal in August 2012, SEC Commissioners voted 
4-1 in July of 2013 to adopt a new final Rule 506(c) under the Securities 
Act.107  The final rule was published in the Federal Register on July 24, 
2013.108  As of September 23, 2013, issuers were cleared to begin soliciting 
investors by advertising unregistered securities over the Internet, provided 
that all purchasers are accredited investors.109  Though the method of these 
communications is now unrestricted, these solicitations are still subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.110 
The SEC said it received “concerns” about the possible integration in the 
period before its proposed crowdfunding rule.111  The Staff may receive 
even more comment letters considering whether or not the proposed non-
integration is appropriate, given potential compliance concerns, not to 
mention the conflicting statutory goals of the repeal of the general 
solicitation ban and the adoption of the crowdfunding exemption.  Regarding 
the latter, the general solicitation repeal targets accredited investors, while 
the crowdfunding exemption is associated with special investor protection 
measures to mitigate the risks of attracting the general public to an online 
offering.112 
Regarding potential compliance issues, consider, for instance, that non-
integration would permit firms to generally advertise to the public under 
Rule 506(c), inadvertently attracting non-accredited investors to its 4(a)(6) 
crowdfunding portal, which possibly circumvents the crowdfunding 
advertising rules.113  Under the Crowdfunding Rule Proposal, issuers are 
 
 105. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1) (limiting the general advertising of securities offered 
or sold under Reg. D in any form, including “[a]ny advertisement, article, notice or other 
communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast 
over television or radio”). 
 106. The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1). 
 107. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising 
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (Jul. 24, 2013) (to be codified 
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230, 239 and 242). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 44,772 (“The final rule and form amendments are effective on September 
23, 2013”). 
 110. Id. at 44,785. 
 111. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 at 
66,431.  
 112. CFIRA Comment Letter, supra note 97, at 3. 
 113. Id. at 2-3 (“permitting an issuer to conduct a single offering in separate tranches 
and to treat each tranche separately for compliance purposes would enable the issuer to 
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prohibited from advertising the terms of a 4(a)(6) offering to the public, 
“except for notices that direct investors to the intermediary’s platform.”114  
The content of a permissible crowdfunding advertising notice is restricted to 
essentially: 1) a statement that the issuer is conducting an offering (along 
with the name of the intermediary); 2) the terms of the offering; and 3) some 
limited factual information about the identity of the issuer.115   
However, consider a circumstance where an issuer purchases a 506(c)-
exempt Super Bowl TV advertisement viewed by the entire American 
football fan base, accredited and non-accredited investors alike.  After the 
game, say a curious non-accredited investor conducts an Internet search to 
locate the issuer with the intent of investing, but finds the funding portal 
hosting that issuer’s ongoing crowdfunding offering.  If the investor 
purchased shares via the crowdfunding intermediary, would the SEC staff 
interpret that investor to be a “purchaser” for purposes Rule 506(c)’s 
accredited status verification requirement?  It is arguable that such a non-
accredited investor is a purchaser because, technically, the first time he 
heard about the offering was in the commercial—not in a crowdfunding-
limited notice.  In this case, it would be debatable whether all of the 
purchasers involved in the generally-advertised offering could ultimately 
qualify as accredited investors, as required by 506(c),116 or whether the 
issuer was merely seeking to condition the market for its crowdfunding 
venture using a Super Bowl ad.  With the ubiquity of internet search engines 
and smart phones, it is not unreasonable to imagine that many non-
accredited investors’ first action would be to conduct a web search of the 
issuer after seeing such an ad, only to find the funding portal. 
One crowdfunding group emphasized this very issue to the SEC, 
requesting that the “Commission provide clarification regarding the 
solicitation activities that are appropriate in concurrent or almost-so 
crowdfunding and 506 offerings.”117  For its part, the SEC’s crowdfunding 
rule proposal asked more questions than it answered in this regard.118  
 
circumvent the 35-non-accredited investor participation limit and still claim the benefit of 
the Rule 506 safe harbor”). 
 114. 78  Fed Reg. at 66,555 (Nov. 5, 2013) (proposing C.F.R. §227.204(a)). 
 115.  78 Fed Reg. at 66,555 (Nov. 5, 2013) (proposing C.F.R. §227.204(b)(1-3)).  The 
factual information is limited to the name of the issuer, its address, phone, email address, 
Web site, and a brief description of its business.  Id. 
 116. CFIRA SEC Comment Letter, supra note 97, at 3. 
 117. Id. at 3. 
 118. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66,428 at 
66,433 (asking no fewer than 10 integration questions, among them whether the Staff 
should “prohibit an issuer from offering securities in reliance on Section 4(a)(6) within a 
specified period of time after or concurrently with a Rule 506(c) offering under 
Regulation D involving general solicitation?”). 
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However, in the example above, it is doubtful the SEC would destroy the 
506(c) exemption, since the investor was then subject to the investor 
protections of the crowdfunding offering.  However, this is an example of 
potential timing and market conditioning issues that the SEC may confront 
in disallowing integration of 4(a)(6) offerings.   
If permitted in the final rule on crowdfunding, the ability of an issuer to 
“piggyback” a $1 million offering in crowdfund-exempt transactions along 
with other Reg. D safe harbors would be particularly significant for 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical startups, because such firms typically 
generate high administrative and research costs.119  These high costs at the 
outset are a major contributor to what makes life science startups 
characteristically high-risk ventures, driving up the cost of capital in the 
early stages.120  While the crowdfunding exception could be a lifeline for 
some biotechnology startups,121 the $1 million cap placed on issuers 
employing the crowdfunding exemption may also limit the value of the 
exemption for small businesses,122 and particularly, for life science 
companies.123  Therefore, the SEC’s proposal to allow for concurrent 
offerings alongside crowdfunding may provide more hope for life sciences 
startups to raise far more than the $1 million under the JOBS Act’s new 
exemptions, provided that the SEC clarifies potential timing and solicitation 
issues. 
 
 119. IAN COCKBURN & JOSH LERNER, ANALYSIS GROUP, THE COST OF CAPITAL FOR 
EARLY-STAGE BIOTECHNOLOGY VENTURES 2-3 (Jun. 29, 2006) 
http://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedFiles/News_and_Events/News/Cockburn_Lerner
_CoC_in_%20Biotech.pdf (estimating cost of capital for life science startups to be 20% 
compared to average for all public companies of 10%); see also Press Release, Nat’l 
Venture Capital Ass’n (“NVCA”), Cost of Capital For Early Stage Biotech Start-Ups 
Found To Be In Excess Of 20 Percent (July 10, 2009) (citing COCKBURN & LERNER) and 
Press Release, Office of Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Rep. Eshoo Hosts Briefing on 
Follow-On Biologics, (Jul. 10, 2009) (hyper-linking to COCKBURN & LERNER and stating 
that Congressional briefing featured NVCA presentation of study). 
 120. COCKBURN & LERNER, supra note 119, at 6 (identifying several challenging 
features unique to biotech ventures: long marketing timelines, illiquid assets, high levels 
of risk, and capital-intensive technology costs); see also infra, Part III.A.1. 
 121. Krist Werling, Bob Cohen, & Michael Pilo, The Risks and Perils of 
Crowdfunding, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS (Mar. 5, 2013), 
http://www.genengnews.com/gen-articles/the-risks-and-perils-of-crowdfunding/4760/. 
 122. CFIRA Comment Letter, supra note 97, at 3 (“[I]ssuers will likely select raising 
capital via a Reg. D offering to avoid the $1 million cap imposed upon crowdfunded 
companies”). 
 123. COCKBURN & LERNER, supra note 119, at 6; but see discussion of the economics 
of biotechnology capital formation, infra Part III.A.3. 
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3. The SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Verification Standard. 
The third reason Reg. D is implicated in the future of crowdfunding is 
because the SEC staff’s choices throughout the implementation of Rule 
506(c) may offer indications of what can be expected as the SEC processes 
comments on its first proposed crowdfunding rule.124  The JOBS Act 
directed the SEC to lift the ban on general advertising of securities offerings, 
but section 201(a)(1) stated that “[s]uch rules shall require the issuer to take 
reasonable steps to verify that purchasers of the securities are accredited 
investors, using such methods as determined by the Commission.”125  The 
original 2012 Proposed General Solicitation Rule126 adopted a hands-off 
approach to this verification requirement by suggesting a flexible standard 
that takes into account the facts and circumstances.127  The Commission 
identified several factors that investors might use to determine what 
constitutes “reasonable steps,” such as the nature of the purchaser, the type 
of accredited investor the purchaser claims to be, the amount and type of 
information that the issuer possesses about the purchaser, and finally, the 
nature of the offering.128  However, commentators largely interpreted the 
2012 Proposed General Solicitation Rule as specifically avoiding the 
adoption of a hard list of methods indicating what would evidence 
“reasonable steps” for future use by regulators and courts.129 
 
 124. The public comment period for the crowdfunding rule proposal ends 90 days 
after its publication in the Federal Register. Securities Act Release No. 33-9470 (Oct. 23, 
2013). 
 125. The JOBS Act § 201(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 126. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising 
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 77 Fed. Reg. 54,464 (proposed Sep. 5, 2012) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239). 
 127. Id. at § 54,467 (proposing a requirement that issuers “‘take reasonable steps to 
verify’ that the purchasers of the offered securities are accredited investors” as measured 
by an “objective determination, based on the particular facts and circumstances of each 
transaction.”). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Sara Hanks, New Rule 506(c): General Solicitation in Regulation D 
Offerings, CROWDCHECK.COM (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://www.crowdcheck.com/blog/analysis-secs-proposed-rule-506c (“The SEC declined 
to specify even a non-exclusive list” of methods it would consider “reasonable steps to 
verify” that purchasers are accredited); Dean F. Hanley and Paul Bork, Securities Alert: 
SEC Proposes JOBS Act Amendments To Rule 506 And Rule 144A To Remove Ban On 
General Solicitation, FOLEY HOAG LLP (Sept. 11, 2012), 
http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2012/september/sec-proposes-
jobs-act-amendments-to-rule-506-and-rule-144a (stating that “[t]o the dismay of many, 
the SEC declined to establish what specifically will constitute ‘reasonable steps,’ instead 
indicating that each transaction would be judged based on the facts and circumstances.”). 
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After public commenters requested more clarity,130 the SEC outlined a 
nonexclusive list of four methods that would qualify under the statutory 
standard as “reasonable steps” under Rule 506(c).  The General Solicitation 
Final Rule outlines four specific non-exclusive methods for issuers 
advertising broadly under 506(c) to verify the accredited investor status of 
individual purchasers.131  First, for an accredited investor claiming to qualify 
as a purchaser in the 506(c) offering by using his or her income level, an 
issuer’s reliance on any Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) income statements 
from the last 2 years constitutes reasonable steps of verification.132  Second, 
an issuer is deemed to satisfy the verification requirement of an investor 
claiming to qualify based on his net worth by reviewing his assets (using 
bank statements, brokerage statements, etc.) and liabilities (using a credit 
report).133  Third, and perhaps key for crowdfunding, is that an issuer can 
satisfy Rule 506(c)’s verification requirement by reasonably relying on the 
assurances of certain third parties that are already subject to robust 
regulation in their own right, such as registered broker-dealers, licensed 
attorneys, certified public accountants, and SEC-registered investment 
advisers.134  Finally, the SEC will accept reliance on previous investor 
qualifications under Rule 506(b) as a way to grandfather in bona fide 
accredited investors with a pre-existing relationship with the issuer,135 and 
the SEC will also continue to accept the traditional reasonable belief 
standard found in Reg. D.136 
The SEC conceded it “continue[s] to recognize that a person could 
provide false information or documentation to an issuer in order to purchase 
securities in an offering made under new Rule 506(c).”137  As will be 
 
 130. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising 
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,777 (Final Rule published 
on Jul. 24, 2013) (“A number of these commenters cited the lack of legal certainty that 
the verification requirement has been satisfied in any given situation as the reason why, 
in their view, the Commission should include a non-exclusive list of verification methods 
in Rule 506(c).”); see also Hanley and Bork, Securities Alert, supra note 129 (“Many 
practitioners feel that the SEC should have provided a real safe harbor about what 
constitutes a ‘reasonable basis’ for believing that an investor is accredited.”). 
 131. 78 Fed. Reg. 44,780 (Jul. 24, 2013). 
 132. Plus, a written confirmation from the investor claiming that he or she expects to 
make the same income in the upcoming year.  Id. at 44,781. 
 133. Id. at 44,781. 
 134. Id. at 44,781-82. 
 135. Id. at 44,781. 
 136. Id. at 44,782. 
 137. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising 
in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,782 (Jul. 24, 2013) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. Pts. 230, 239, 242). 
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discussed below, a similar problem is presented by income or net worth 
information provided by crowdfunding investors to intermediaries.  
Concerns regarding a flexible, market-based approach, and other 
possibilities for compliance with the single-issuer and aggregate investment 
limits, are discussed infra in Part V. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CROWDFUND ACT. 
A. Congressional Willingness to Capitalize on a Recent Crowdfunding 
Phenomenon Led to a Brief Legislative History. 
Crowdfunding has been characterized as “a recent phenomenon,” with the 
“term crowdfunding first appear[ing] in 2006.”138  The first crowdfunding 
website, Kiva, started in 2005,139 and its use has generally increased such 
that crowdfunding is now being employed to fund efforts for everything 
from filmmaking and music to health care and information technology.  The 
first crowdfunding bill was introduced in the House of Representatives in 
September of 2011 by Republican Representative Patrick McHenry of North 
Carolina.140  After passing in the House in November of 2011,141  
Congressman McHenry’s crowdfunding bill was incorporated into the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act with only minor changes and 
passed in March 2012.142  However, the Senate replaced the House version 
of the crowdfunding exemption with a new Senate provision attached to the 
JOBS Act,143 which was the version ultimately signed into law by President 
Obama on April 5, 2012.144  The President had announced his support for 
crowdfunding only seven months prior to signing it into law.145  Between the 
first bill’s introduction in the House and the signing of the JOBS Act by the 
 
 138. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 196. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011). 
 141. Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930, 112th Cong. § 2(a) (as passed 
and amended by the House on Nov. 3, 2011). 
 142. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606 112th Cong., §§ 301-303, Title 
III, Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act; see 158 CONG. REC. H1288 (Mar. 8, 2012). 
 143. Senate Amendment 1884, 112th Cong. (2012).  
 144. President Obama’s Remarks on Signing the JOBS Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2012), reprinted in 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. S4. 
 145. Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy (Nov. 2, 
2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr2930r_20111
102.pdf  (“The Administration supports House passage of H.R. 2930.”). 
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President, there were several Congressional hearings mentioning 
crowdfunding.146 
B. Bipartisan Passage of the JOBS Act Amid Vociferous Dissent. 
Although the JOBS Act passed the Senate with seventy-three votes and 
received bipartisan support,147 the crowdfunding exemption was not without 
its critics.  Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) took to the Senate floor in opposition 
to the JOBS Act, saying, “[w]e are about to embark upon the most sweeping 
deregulatory effort and assault on investor protection in decades.”148  After 
eviscerating the rest of the Act, Senator Levin conceded that the amendment 
offered by Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR) made modest improvements to 
reduce crowdfunding risks, but he still implored: “[w]e should not fool 
ourselves.  These improvements, if adopted, though welcome, are far from 
sufficient. . . . If we pass this bill, it will allow new opportunities for fraud 
and abuse in capital markets.”149 
Similar criticisms of crowdfunding emerged as different proposals wound 
their way through Congress.150  Securities expert, Professor John Coffee of 
Columbia, for instance, mockingly called Senator Brown’s initial 
crowdfunding bill, S. 1791, The Boiler Room Legalization Act of 2011 
because of broker registration exemptions.151  Professor Coffee observed: 
 
 146. A search of “crowdfunding” in the Congressional Record yields several results 
prior to April 2012.  Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting 
Investors: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th 
Cong. (2011); Legislative Proposals to Facilitate Small Business Capital Formation and 
Job Creation: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored 
Enters., H. Comm. on Fin. Svcs, 112th Cong. (2011); Crowdfunding: Connecting 
Investors And Job Creators: Hearing before the Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Svcs. and 
Bailouts of Public and Private Programs Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Svcs. and Bailouts of 
Public and Private Programs Oversight and Gov’t Reform Committee, 112th Cong.  
(2011).  Since the passage of the JOBS Act, however, there have been other hearings in 
Congress. JOBS Act in Action Part II: Overseeing Effective Implementation of the JOBS 
Act at the SEC, Subcomm. on TARP, Fin. Svcs. and Bailouts of Public and Private 
Programs, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 147. 158 CONG. REC. S1977 (Mar. 22, 2012) (detailing Roll Call Vote #55 on passage 
of H.R. 3606 with 25 Democrats and 48 Republicans voting in favor). 
 148. 158 CONG. REC. S1963 (Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin). 
 149. Id. at S1964. It is unclear, however, whether Sen. Levin is referring here to the 
CROWDFUND Act. 
 150. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting 
Investors: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 112th 
Cong. 62-66 (2011) (statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, 
Columbia Univ. Law School). 
 151. Id. at 61,64 (stating that the broker registration exemption presented 
“unparalleled opportunities for the traditional boiler room operation to reemerge”). 
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Because the maximum aggregate amount that may be raised in any 
12-month period is $1 million, this exemption is likely to be used 
primarily by early stage issuers that do not yet have an operating 
history or, possibly, even financial statements. Such issuers are in 
effect flying on a ‘wing and a prayer,’ selling hope more than 
substance. Precisely because of this profile, however, such 
offerings are uniquely subject to fraud, and some issuers will 
simply be phantom companies without any assets, business model, 
or real world existence.152 
The Senate responded by adopting an amendment sponsored by Senators 
Merkley, Bennet (D-CO), and Brown (R-MA) which included key investor 
protection measures, such as investment limits.153  Senator Merkley 
explained following passage of the CROWDFUND Act that the individual 
investment cap is “an important investor protection” provision and that 
aggregate caps serve as a stopgap against an investor “unintentionally 
wiping out their entire savings.”154  The director of investor protection at the 
Consumer Federation of America was still skeptical, warning that 
crowdfunding should occupy “precisely the same place in the average 
person’s investment portfolio that lottery tickets do . . . If you have a little 
spare cash that you think it would be fun to gamble with, that’s fine, but 
don’t consider it part of a well-thought-out investment strategy.”155  The 
president of the North American Securities Administrators Association has 
also expressed concerns, indicating “[s]tates are concerned that the fraud and 
scammers will come out of the closets now and start using social networking 
sites to rip off investors.”156  Professor Steven C. Bradford of the University 
of Nebraska, who has comprehensively addressed crowdfunding in law 
review articles and testified before two congressional committees on the 
subject,157 expressed disappointment in the final bill, saying Congress 
 
 152. Id. at 64. 
 153. Senate Amendment 1884, 112th Cong. (2012) replaced a House version and was 
passed 64-35.  158 CONG. REC. S1976-1977 (Mar. 22, 2012); see also Mari Serebrov, The 
Senate Adds Investor Protection for Crowdfunding to JOBS Act, BIO WORLD TODAY 
(Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.bioworld.com/content/senate-adds-investor-protection-
crowd-funding-jobs-act-0. 
 154. 158 CONG. REC S5476 (July 26, 2012). 
 155. Margaret Collins, Will Crowdfunding Beget Crowdfrauding?, BUSINESSWEEK 
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-26/will-crowdfunding-
beget-crowdfrauding. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 94 (stating “Senator Merkley’s 
[crowdfunding] bill also incorporates several of the policy recommendations made in this 
article.”); Financial Services and Bailouts of Public and Private Programs, Hearing on 
The JOBS Act Before the Subcomm. on TARP, 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of C. 
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“threw together a poorly drafted regulatory bundle of old ideas that is 
complicated, expensive, and unlikely to have much of an effect on the small 
business capital gap.”158 
III. THE POTENTIAL BOON FOR HEALTH STARTUPS. 
A. Where Venture Capitalists See High Risk in Life Sciences, Crowdfunding 
Investors May See Opportunity for a Cure. 
1. Hindrances to Venture Capitalist Investment in Biotech May Not 
Apply to Crowdfunding. 
The economics of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors 
(“biopharma”) are distinguishable from other sectors such as information 
technology, in that returns on investment may take much longer, investors 
can expect to hold illiquid assets for a long period of time, biopharma 
endeavors can be capital intensive in the short term, and the chances that 
drugs will actually make it to market are slim.159  Compared to other 
startups, venture capitalists investing in biopharma enterprises “need to take 
on more risk, hold illiquid investments, and wait longer for a return.”160  
Therefore, such equity investments cost more to the issuer.  This could be 
used as a rationale for pessimism regarding the potential impact of the 
crowdfunding legislation on biopharma capital formation.161  The failure rate 




 158. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 222. 
 159. IAN COCKBURN & JOSH LERNER, THE COST OF CAPITAL FOR EARLY-STAGE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY VENTURES, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION 6 (Jul. 10, 2009) 
(identifying several challenging features unique to biotech ventures: long marketing 
timelines, illiquid assets, high levels of risk, and capital-intensive technology costs). 
 160. Id.  Put differently, the high risk of a life sciences investment for a small amount 
of venture capitalists drives up the cost of capital formation for the startup; see also 
Biggest Biotech Trends of 2012, GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, (Dec. 
31, 2012), http://www.genengnews.com/insight-and-intelligence/biggest-biotech-trends-
of-2012/77899744/. (stating that investors blame the decline in venture capital investment 
in biotechnology in 2012, in part, on “biopharma startups’ greater risk than other techs”). 
 161. Stephanie Baum, The JOBS Act, crowdfunding and what it will mean for 
healthcare startups, MEDCITY NEWS (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://medcitynews.com/2012/04/the-jobs-act-and-what-crowdfunding-will-mean-for-
healthcare-startups/. (“With President Barack Obama signing the Jumpstart Our Business 
Startups Bill into law today, the crowdfunding provision could mark a new era for 
startups and make it easier to raise money with more investment from new investors who 
fuel early and later-stage healthcare companies.”). 
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Merkley has described the expectations of venture capitalist this way: 
“Angel and venture capital funds, whose mission is to invest in the start-up 
sector, tend to invest in perhaps one out of one hundred opportunities 
presented and assume that ninety-five percent of investments will fail 
entirely.  Their profits commonly emerge out of only a handful of big 
winners.”162  However, the fact that fewer than 1% of new drugs make it to 
market may worry a small sliver of wealthy venture capitalists more than it 
does a “crowd” of investors attracted to an idea through social media.163  In 
other words, a venture capital firm, which assumes a large amount of 
downside risk on all of its endeavors, may be far more concerned about the 
statistical probabilities of the success of a new drug treatment than will a 
group of low-dollar investors, representing an array of individual interests, 
attracted through social media to that specific idea for a variety reasons.164 
2. Decline in Biotechnology Venture Capital Investment May Reflect a 
Funding Gap. 
Recent trends further demonstrate that there is a venture capital funding 
gap for biotechnology firms, particularly in the startup phase.  The quarterly 
MoneyTree Report measuring nationwide venture capital activity, published 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers and the National Venture Capital Association, 
shows a 13% decline in overall biotechnology venture capital funding from 
$4.8 billion in 2011 to $4.2 billion in the 2012.165  The number of venture 
capital-funded biotech deals has been steady over that time, with 472 deals 
in 2011 and 480 in 2012.166 
There are limitations to using this data as a measure of the potential for 
crowdfunding, as it includes the investment activity primarily of 
professional venture capital (“VC”) funds and venture subsidiaries of 
 
 162. 158 CONG. REC. S5476 (Jul. 26, 2012) (Stmt. Of Sen. Merkley (OR). 
 163. COCKBURN & LERNER, supra note 119 (Jun. 29, 2006) (noting that “fewer than 
1% of drug candidates will make it to market”). 
 164. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3 (discussing the motivations of crowdfunding investors 
as distinguished from primarily profit-seeking venture capitalists). 
 165. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS/VENTURE CAPITAL ASS’N, MONEYTREE REPORT: 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY HISTORICAL TREND DATA, 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/nav.jsp?page=historical [hereinafter 
MONEYTREE REPORT].   Data is provided by Thomson Reuters.  The MoneyTree Report 
is described by its collaborators as  ”the only industry-endorsed research of its kind,” the 
“definitive source of information on emerging companies that receive financing and the 
venture capital firms that provide it,” and “a staple of the financial community, 
entrepreneurs, government policymakers and the business press worldwide.”   
 166. Id. 
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investment banks, as opposed to data from all private placements.167  
However, the data provides some useful guidance on financing trends.  
Particularly pertinent to the crowdfunding discussion is the critical funding 
gap in the biotechnology startup phase. 
Venture capital investment in the biotechnology “startup/seed” funding 
stage decreased from $339 million in 2011 to $288 million in 2012, 
representing a 15% drop, with a corresponding 18% decrease in the number 
of VC-funded deals.168  These figures compare with $731 million invested in 
140 deals in 2008 (averaging $5.2 million per deal), $735 million in 125 
deals in 2009 (averaging $5.9 million), and $599 million in 110 deals for 
2010 ($5.5 million).169  Notably, the average investment deal in the 
startup/seed phase of biotechnology funding decreased from $5.9 million in 
2009 to $4.3 million in 2013.170  In addition to a notable decrease in the 
average investment, this range suggests that the $1 million annual cap on 
crowdfunding offerings171 may not be a significant hindrance to capital 
formation in biotechnology, at least for the startup phase.172 
3. The Promise of Life Science Companies Concern Matters of the 
Heart, Which May Attract Low Dollar Crowdfunding Investors. 
Where a venture capitalist may avoid a life sciences startup, such as 
Jimmy Lin’s Rare Genomics Institute, as a far-fetched and capital-intensive 
genome sequencing project,173 large amounts of small investors may be less 
risk averse, more attracted to the hopeful idea of the endeavor, and less 
 
 167. Id., Report Definitions and Methodology, available at 
https://www.pwcmoneytree.com/MTPublic/ns/nav.jsp?page=definitions#stage. 
 168. Venture capital funded deals in biotech decreased from 80 deals in 2011 to 66 
deals in 2012.  MONEYTREE REPORT, supra note 165 (defining parameters by 
“Biotechnology” Industry and “Startup/Seed” Stage). 
 169. Id.  Some of these figures have shifted over time with updates in the data, but the 
downward trends have remained unaffected. 
 170. Id. (reflecting $176 million in only 41 over first three quarters of 2013). The 
average investment per biotechnology deal, taken annually, for the other years are: $4.24 
million in 2011 ($339 million in 08 startup/seed deals), $5.5 million in 2010 ($599 
million in 110 deals), and $5.7 million in 2008 ($721 million in 127 deals).  Id. 
 171. The JOBS Act exempts “transactions involving the offer or sale of securities by 
an issuer . . . provided that,” inter alia “the aggregate amount sold to all investors by the 
issuer, including any amount sold in reliance on the exemption provided under this 
paragraph during the 12-month period preceding the date of such transaction, is not more 
than $1,000,000.”  Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6)(A), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 
302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 315 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A) (2012). 
 172. But see supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. 
 173. Solomont, Rare Genomics, supra note 4. 
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concerned with an immediate return on their investments.174  Low dollar 
investors may be more patient than “angel investors”175 or venture 
capitalists, and more willing to provide seed money to such projects.176 
For instance, consider the economics of capital formation for a Seattle-
based biotechnology firm, Kineta.177  Though Kineta has not employed 
crowdfunding, it has accumulated a diverse set of investors that include a 
charitable foundation and a “string of small financing deals.”178  Kineta, a 
multi-million dollar federal contract awardee,179 raised $11 million from 
individual investors, the Iacocca Family Foundation, MPI Research, and 
a group of 30 pharmaceutical executives, according to a company 
representative.180  The Iacocca Family Foundation is run by a Chrysler 
executive who lost his wife to diabetes, and he is particularly interested in 
the work Kineta is doing to combat autoimmune disease, including type 1 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. For a discussion of the differences between an angel investor and a venture 
capitalist, see Michael B. Farrrell, Angel Investors Flood The Tech Start-Up Scene, BOS. 
GLOBE, (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/03/16/rise-angel-
investors/mjt8DYNxWj0bcShK4ElwhN/story.html. 
 176. Sara Hanks, Crowdcheck, Webinar: Crowdfunding for Entrepreneurs, RESEARCH 
COMMERCIALIZATION AND SBIR CENTER (June 20, 2012), 
http://center.ncet2.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=500&Itemid=8
7 (discussing advantages of crowdfunding over conventional funding options, such as 
crowdfunding investors are likely to be more patient, there is flexibility to tailor financing 
needs [debt v. equity], and geographic boundaries and social connections become less 
determinative of access to capital). 
 177. See About Us, KINETA, http://www.kinetabio.com/aboutus.html. 
 178. Luke Timmerman, Playing for Bunt Singles, Builds a Biotech Company Without 
VC Bucks, XCONOMY.COM (June 6, 2012),  
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2012/06/06/kineta-playing-for-bunt-singles-builds-a-
biotech-company-without-vc-bucks/. 
 179. Luke Timmerman, Seattle’s Kineta Rakes in Half of $13M Federal Contract to 
UW For Vaccine Boosters, XCONOMY.COM (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2009/11/10/seattles-kineta-rakes-in-half-of-13m-
federal-contract-to-uw-for-vaccine-boosters/. 
 180. Press Release, Kineta, Inc., NIH-Funded Project to Develop Vaccine Immune 
Boosters University of Washington (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/10/idUS105167+10-Nov-2009+BW20091110; 
Luke Timmerman,  Kineta, Playing for Bunt Singles, Builds a Biotech Company Without 
VC Bucks, XCONOMY.COM (June 6, 2012),  
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2012/06/06/kineta-playing-for-bunt-singles-builds-a-
biotech-company-without-vc-bucks/; see also, NAT’L  INST. HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT OF 
KV1.3 CHANNEL BLOCKER SHK-186 AS A THERAPY FOR MULTIPLE SCLEROSIS, 
http://projectreporter.nih.gov/project_info_description.cfm?aid=8053763&icde=1477517
4. 
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diabetes.181  “The heart, it turns out, is a strong motivator,” and the non-
profit’s investment was reported to represent “an example of how 
foundations are recasting the model of philanthropy” by making an equity 
investment in promising companies in the hopes of advancing biotech 
solutions, with “the potential for a double payoff if the company 
succeeds.”182 
This exemplifies the sort of endeavor that is likely to find crowdfunding 
beneficial because, where matters of the heart are concerned, crowdfunding 
investors, like charitable foundations, are more likely to carry the requisite 
“patience to support lengthy clinical trials to determine whether” a given 
drug works in humans.183  Thus, crowdfunding, where multiple low-dollar 
investors undertake a cost-benefit investment calculus that is quite different 
than that of risk-averse professional investors, has the capacity to 
fundamentally alter the sometimes grim underlying economic dynamics of 
capital formation for early stage life science endeavors.  The dreaded 
“Valley of Death”184 is easier to overcome with more time, patience, and 
less risk aversion. 
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR HEIGHTENED FRAUD AMONG HEALTH CARE 
ISSUERS. 
A. Unique Risks for Small Cap Fraud Reminiscent of Penny Stock Scandals. 
Many crowdfunding observers have warned of the heightened risk 
involved in low-dollar investments of unsophisticated parties in small 
businesses.  The proposition has been described as “very risky” because 
small businesses are usually illiquid, more likely to fail, and “[l]osses due to 
 
 181. Kristi Heim, Seattle Biotech Kineta Wins Over Heartfelt Funding, SEATTLE 
TIMES, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2012042365_kineta07.html, (last 
updated June 7, 2010, 11:30am) (“The Iacocca Family Foundation is investing in Kineta 
to spur its efforts to develop the new drug, called ShK-186.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. The “Valley of Death” refers to the capital-intensive nature of the initial stage of 
development for a startup company, which often includes extensive research and 
development expenses, prior to the transition to marketing its products.  See Evan Mills 
and Jonathan Livingston, Traversing The Valley Of Death, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2005, 4:00 
PM) http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/17/utilities-emerging-tech-
cz_1117energy_programs.html.  In biotechnology, these early stage expenses can make 
venture capitalists especially squeamish.  See Deanna Pogoreic, The Biotech Valley Of 
Death Has Become The Uncrossable Canyon, MEDCITY NEWS (Sept. 21, 2012, 10:42 
AM), http://medcitynews.com/2012/09/the-biotech-valley-of-death-has-become-the-
uncrossable-canyon-heres-one-innovative-approach-to-funding/. 
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fraud and self-dealing are also much more likely.”185  This is the lesson, it is 
argued, to be learned from the devastating outbreak of penny stock securities 
fraud during the 1980s.186  Professor Bradford made this observation: 
The abuses in the penny stock market in the 1980s “typify the 
securities fraud potential associated with direct marketing of 
microcap securities to individual investors.” The SEC’s experience 
when it eased the requirements of the Rule 504 small offering 
exemption in the 1990s also illustrates the potential fraud 
associated with unregulated small offerings. The changes freed 
Rule 504 offerings from federal mandatory disclosure 
requirements even when those offerings were not registered at the 
state level. In New York, which has no state registration 
requirement, “Rule 504 was being used by nefarious promoters to 
distribute up to $1 million of securities in New York to a select 
favored group, followed promptly by boiler-room promotions that 
artificially drove up the secondary market price until such time as 
the initial purchasers could sell their shares at a handsome profit, 
leaving the gullible crop of new investors with suddenly deflated 
shares and irrecoverable losses.”187 
Thomas Lee Hazen, a professor of law at the University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, expresses similar apprehension: 
Exposing unsophisticated investors to risky investments without 
adequate disclosure unduly sacrifices investor-protection goals to 
the perceived need to lower the disclosure barriers for small 
businesses and crowdfunding techniques. The Internet and social 
networking offer fertile ground for scammers. Scammers and 
securities fraudsters have for nearly a century found ways to adapt 
their scams to new technologies. Consider, for example, high-
pressure boiler room sales operations or the promotion of fictitious 
or worthless securities to build Ponzi schemes. The Internet has 
also proven to be fertile ground for pump and dump schemes.  
Boiler room tactics have adapted to new technologies. For 
example, telephonic cold calling has been supplemented or 
superseded by spam emails. In other words, the benefits of 
technology necessarily offer scammers new opportunities. The 
Internet as a forum for crowdfunding thus does not by itself 
warrant a special exemption. It is to be expected that absent 
compliance with the crowdfunding exemption, the SEC will 
 
 185. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 105-06. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
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vigorously pursue crowdfunding efforts without 1933 Act 
registration.188 
Senator Merkley warned in 2011: 
[T]here are real risks of investment losses at a rate far beyond 
ordinary investing. Crowdfunding, if done without proper 
oversight, provides significant opportunity for fraud. Indeed, it 
was not too long ago that our financial regulators were doing daily 
battle with scam artists pitching huge returns on fraudulent 
schemes through small, unregistered securities.189 
B. Health Care Startups May Attract Bad Actors. 
Some crowdfunding industry advocates downplay questions the JOBS Act 
presents regarding the potential for fraud.190  This overlooks legitimate 
concerns that the hopeful cyber atmosphere developing in the crowdfunding 
community could combine with factors unique to health care to increase 
investor risk exposure.  Issuers selling securities over the internet based on 
the promise of curing a rare disease, for instance, may attract a more 
vulnerable subset of unsophisticated investors who are more willing to part 
with their money for a good cause.191  The factors contributing to the success 
of donation-based crowdfunding endeavors in health care may exacerbate 
the risk of fraud in this sector for the equity-based crowdfunding model. 
It is debatable whether the risk is higher for seniors, who are regarded as 
an already-at-risk population by regulators and consumer groups.192  Seniors 
 
 188. Hazen, supra note 28, at 1767-68 (2012). 
 189. 157 Cong. Rec. S8458 (Dec. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Merkley). 
 190. See, e.g., Jason Best & Sherwood Neiss, Crowdfunding Delayed Again, Blasted 
As A “Top Danger”, VENTUREBEAT (Aug. 22, 2012, 5:10 PM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2012/08/22/crowdfunding-delayed-again-blasted-as-a-top-danger/  
(claiming that “no cases of successful fraud have been discovered” in the United 
Kingdom and Australia since crowdfunding was legalized there, and that, in donation-
based crowdfunding in the U.S., “fraud has been caught rapidly, and always before funds 
are distributed, as social network uncover the truth” thanks in part to “sophisticated 
algorithms to detect fraud”). 
 191. Chuck Jaffe, JOBS Act Benefits Financial Criminals, MARKETWATCH.COM, 
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/jobs-act-benefits-financial-
criminals-2012-03-29?pagenumber=2 (“The most promising startup in this new 
environment might be a boiler-room pump-and-dump operation. . . . investors who are 
too trusting in this environment will be the next legion of victims in financial frauds.”). 
 192. Edward Wyatt, Senate Delays Vote on Start-Ups Bill for 2 Amendments, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/business/senate-delays-
vote-on-start-ups-bill-for-2-amendments.html (“Some Democrats, who made up all the 
opposing votes to the bill, and consumer-advocacy organizations were less optimistic 
about the effect of a law that rolls back regulations on corporate financial disclosure. 
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are often the target of scam artists,193 but their engagement with 
crowdfunding portals online through social media may be somewhat limited.  
However, web use among senior citizens is increasing,194 and Internet-based 
fraud can now combine with investment schemes, another pre-existing 
vulnerability, to compound the concern.195 
V. INVESTMENT LIMITS POSE COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS. 
A. Investment Limits Are Among Investor Protection Measures. 
Two key investor protection measures196 were included in the 
CROWDFUND Act: (1) an individual limit on the amount an investor may 
invest in any single crowdfunding venture (“single-issuer investment 
limit”),197 and (2) a requirement that intermediaries ensure that such investor 
not exceed his investment limits in the aggregate among all crowdfunding 
ventures (“aggregate investment limit”).198 
 
Pension funds, lobbying organizations like AARP and the chairwoman of the S.E.C. have 
also opposed the bill.”). 
 193. Consumer Alert, Scammers Out to Profit on U.S. Supreme Court’s Ruling on the 
Affordable Care Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2012),  
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt047.shtm; see also Consumer Alert, 
Health Care Scams Targeting Elderly, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (July 13, 
2012) (“Federal and state authorities believe scammers will increasingly exploit news 
about the recent health care ruling to target seniors, confuse and rip them off.”). 
 194. Fraud Target: Senior Citizens, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
http://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/fraud/seniors (last visited Dec. 20, 2013) (“As web use 
among senior citizens increases, so does their chances to fall victim to Internet fraud.”); 
Facebook and YouTube Help the Edlerly Keep Their Brains Active and Reduce Stress 
and Depression, DAILY MAIL REPORTER (Apr. 13, 2011) (“Facebook and YouTube help 
the elderly keep their brains active and stave off memory loss, according to scientists. . . 
‘Over the past few years the number of pensioners going online and using social 
networks has increased by 80 per cent,’[Marco Trabucchi, chairman of the Italian 
Association of Psychogeriatrics] added.”). 
 195. Top 10 Scams Targeting Seniors, NAT’L COUNCIL ON AGING, 
http://www.ncoa.org/enhance-economic-security/economic-security-Initiative/savvy-
saving-seniors/top-10-scams-targeting.html (listing Healthcare/Medicare/Health 
Insurance Fraud, Internet Fraud, and Investment Schemes as three of the top ten scams 
targeting seniors),  
 196. While other measures exist, such as the issuer disclosure and investor education 
requirements, this Comment argues that the statutory investment limits constitute the real 
bright-line backstop designed to protect unwitting investors from squandering their 
money over the Internet. 
 197. The Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6)(B)(i)-(ii), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 
302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6)(B)(i)-(ii). 
 198. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 Stat. § 4A(a)(8), 126 Stat. 306, 
316 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)). 
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Originally, Republicans in Congress drafted bills in the House which 
“failed to contain any meaningful investor protections” for crowdfunding.199  
These “bare bones” bills,200 one of which passed by a bipartisan and 
overwhelming majority in the House with the support of the White House,201 
would have allowed any individual to invest, and lose, up to $10,000 or 10% 
of his income, whichever was less.202  A $10,000 total investment cap would 
have been inappropriately high.203  The version passing the House also 
stated that “an issuer or intermediary may rely on certifications as to annual 
income provided by the person to whom the securities are sold to verify the 
investor’s income.”204  As is outlined in Part V.B below, this standard 
prevailed with the SEC Staff in its Proposed Crowdfunding Rule, but at the 
time of the bill’s drafting, the Senate removed this self-verification language 
from the House version.205 
 
 199. Hazen, supra note 28 at 1750; Robb Mandelbaum, Which Crowdfunding Bill Will 
It Be? N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 27, 2012), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/which-
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 200. Hazen, supra note 28 at 1750 (2012). 
 201. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, The American 
Jobs Act (Sept. 8 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/08/fact-
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exemption from SEC registration requirements for firms raising less than $1 million (with 
individual investments limited to $10,000 or 10% of investors’ annual income.)”). 
 202. Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 2930 112th Cong. § 2(a) (2011), (as 
amended and passed by the House, Nov. 3, 2011) (House lawmakers voting 407-17 to 
add a new exception, § 4(6), to the Securities Act of 1933, provided that “(B) the 
aggregate amount sold to any investor in reliance on this exemption within the previous 
12-month period does not exceed the lesser of (i) $10,000 . . . [or] “(ii) 10 percent of such 
investor’s income”), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr2930eh/pdf/BILLS-
112hr2930eh.pdf; see also Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606 112th Cong. 
§ 301 (2012) (as passed by House, Mar. 8, 2012); see also Mandelbaum, supra note 199 
(“Under the terms of the House bill . . . [e]ach investor would be limited to $10,000 or 10 
percent of annual income, whichever is less.”). 
 203. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 130 (“The $10,000 individual limit in 
some of the proposals seems excessive; it is doubtful whether most investors could afford 
an annual loss of that magnitude.”). 
 204. The JOBS Act, H.R. 3606 112th Cong. § 301(b)(2012) (as amended and passed 
by the House, March 2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr3606eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606eh.pdf; see Entrepreneur Access to Capital Act, H.R. 
2930, 112th Cong.§ 2(b)(2011) (as Introduced in House) (proposing to add §4A(c) to the 
Securities Act of 1933).  
 205. 158 CONG. REC. S1884 (Mar. 21, 2012) (proposing amendment to H.R. 3606, the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act); see also 158 CONG. REC. S1806 (Mar. 19, 2012) 
(proposing SA 1884 ”strik[ing] title III” of H.R. 3606 and inserting new text).  
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The Senate sensibly responded by adopting a lower single-issuer 
investment limit,206 and by adding a provision requiring intermediaries to 
make efforts to ensure that investors not exceed these same investment limits 
on the aggregate among all crowdfunding ventures.207  As adopted, the 
CROWDFUND Act limits any individual investor with an annual income or 
net worth below $100,000 to a maximum investment of the greater of $2,000 
per year or 5% of annual income or net worth.208  Investors with an income 
or net worth over $100,000 could invest up to 10% of their annual income or 
net worth, up to a maximum of $100,000.209  The Proposed Crowdfunding 
Rule resolves the ambiguity presented in the statutory language under 
circumstances where an investor’s net worth is below $100,000 but annual 
income is above $100,000 (or vice versa).210 
For investors with an income or net worth above $100,000, the investor is 
limited to an investment of 10 percent of her income or net worth over a 12-
month period, not to exceed $100,000.211  Because the above limits could 
subject an investor with a net worth above $100,000 but an income of less 
than $100,000 (or vice versa) to technically two investment limits, the SEC 
Staff resolved that the greater limit would apply.212  Thus, an investor with 
an annual income of $150,000 but a net worth of $60,000 would be able to 
invest up to $15,000 (10% of his income) in crowdfunding ventures in a 12-
month period.  This has been referred to as the “single-issuer investment 
limit.”213  On the morning of the Commission vote on the proposed rule, 
SEC Commissioner Stein expressed concern about permitting the greater 
investment amount, commenting that “even with primary residences 
excluded from the calculation, I remain concerned that taking the ‘greater 
than’ approach may expose seniors or others to risks and losses they cannot 
afford.”214  
 
 206. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(6)(B)(i)-(ii), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 
302(a), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (codified at 15 U.S.C. Section 77d(6)(B)(i)-(ii)). 
 207. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(8), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(a), 126 
Stat. 306, 316 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §77d(a)(8) (2012)). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. 78 Fed Reg. at 66,433 (“If either annual income or net worth exceeds $100,000, 
then a limit of 10 percent of annual income or net worth, whichever is greater, but not to 
exceed $100,000, would apply.”).  
 211. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(6)(B), 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. §77d(6)(B)). 
 212. 78 Fed Reg. at 66,433. 
 213. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 200. 
 214. SEC Comm’r Kara Stein, Statement Regarding the Proposing Release on 
Crowdfunding (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540008723#.Ur4WeBZU1G4/.  
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Indeed, these two provisions, the single-issuer investment limit and 
aggregate investment limits, now enshrined in the federal securities laws as 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(6)(B) and 77d-1(a)(8), respectively, deserve 
significantly more attention than the SEC gave them in its proposed rule.215  
For instance, although the limits are related, there is a key distinction 
between them and how they impact the exemption.  “An investor’s violation 
of th[e] aggregate limit would affect the exemption differently than an 
investor’s violation of the single-issuer limit.”216  Since the availability of a 
section 4(6) exemption is based on the condition that an issuer not sell shares 
to an investor in excess of the investor’s limit for that issuer (i.e. the single-
issuer limit), if any one investor exceeds his investment threshold for that 
single issuer then the exemption is lost for that issuer.217  However, the 
exemption is not conditioned on all investors staying below their overall 
aggregate limit, but only on the statutory mandate that an intermediary take 
such steps to ensure that investors not exceed that aggregate limit.218  Thus, 
if an investor did in fact exceed his investment limits by having invested too 
much with multiple issuers, the exemption is not lost for all of those issuers, 
so long as the relevant intermediaries satisfied their burdens to ensure that 
the investor had not exceed his aggregate limits.219 
Thus, of particular regulatory concern is the intermediary burden to 
“ensure” compliance with the aggregate investment limit.220  Section 4A(a) 
of Title III states that intermediaries must “make such efforts as the 
Commission determines appropriate, by rule, to ensure that no investor in a 
12-month period has purchased securities offered pursuant to section 4(6) 
that, in the aggregate, from all issuers, exceed the investment limits set forth 
in section 4(6)(B).”221  This places an affirmative duty on the funding 
portals/intermediaries to “ensure that no investor” exceeds the statutory 
limits on his annual crowdfunding investments, but it was unclear at the time 
of the statute’s passage precisely what would be expected of intermediaries 
 
 215. The Proposed Crowdfunding Rule is brief in its rationale discussing self-
verification of investor income and aggregate investments, taking up less than a page of 
the Federal Register. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,469-70. 
 216. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (emphasis added). 
 217. Id. (“If an issuer sells more to an investor than the single-issuer limit allows, the 
exemption would be lost; section 4(6)(B) conditions the exemption on the amount sold to 
the investor not exceeding the limit.”). 
 218. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(8), 126 Stat. 306, 316 (2012) (codified as 15 
U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)). 
 219. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (emphasis added). 
 220. Id. at 201-02. 
 221. Securities Act of 1933 § 4A(a)(8), JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302(b), 126 
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(a)(8)) (emphasis added). 
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to carry out this obligation.222  The following two sections explore the 
Proposed Crowdfunding Rule’s recommended resolution to this compliance 
issue, investor self-verification, and its advantages and disadvantages. 
B. SEC Crowdfunding Rule Proposal Details Liability of Intermediaries and 
Their Duty to “Ensure” Investment Limits. 
1. Intermediaries May Rely on Investors, and Issuers May Rely on 
Intermediaries. 
Since the passage of the statute, legal experts and commenters have 
suspected that enforcing the aggregate investment limits would prove 
difficult.223  Section 4A(a) of the CROWDFUND Act requires inter-
mediaries to “make such efforts as the Commission determines appropriate, 
by rule, to ensure that no investor in a 12-month period has purchased 
securities offered pursuant to section 4(6) that, in the aggregate, from all 
issuers, exceed the investment limits set forth in in section 4(6)(B).”224  Of 
course, as already detailed, Section 4(6)(B) sets forth the single-issuer 
investment limits.225  Thus, since Section 4(6)(B)(i) limits the investments of 
individuals earning less than $100,000 per year to the greater of $2,000 or 
5% of investor net worth or income,226 the aggregate investment limit found 
in Section 4A(a)(8) is identical to the single-issuer investment cap. 
To enforce compliance with these two provisions, the Proposed 
Crowdfunding Rule allows intermediaries to rely on an investor’s 
representations concerning his annual income, net worth, and his aggregate 
amount invested through other crowdfunding-exempt intermediaries.227  To 
this end, the SEC proposed “Regulation Crowdfunding,” which would, in 
part, create 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100(a)(2)228 & 227.303(b).  Section 
227.100(a)(2) memorializes in the Code of Federal Regulations the statutory 
 
 222. Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, supra note 17, at 202 (“It is unclear what the SEC 
will require intermediaries to do to enforce this aggregate limit.”). 
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§ 4(a)(6) single-issuer investment limits, while § 227.303(b) implements § 
4A(a)(8) of the Securities Act of 1933. 
The SEC noted in Instruction 3 to paragraph §227.100(a)(2) that issuers 
may rely on the efforts of intermediaries: 
An issuer offering and selling securities in reliance on Section 
4(a)(6) . . . may rely on the efforts an intermediary is required to 
undertake pursuant to § 227.303(b) to ensure that the aggregate 
amount of securities purchased by an investor in offerings 
pursuant to Section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act will not cause the 
investor to exceed the limit set forth in Section 4(a)(6) of the 
Securities Act and § 227.100(a)(2), provided that the issuer does 
not know that the investor had exceeded the investor limits or 
would exceed the investor limits as a result of purchasing 
securities in the issuer’s offering.229 
This presumably would allow an issuer to retain the crowdfunding 
exemption under circumstances where an investor in actuality exceeds his 
limits but where the intermediary complies with proposed § 227.303(b), 
unless the issuer otherwise knows that the investor is unqualified to make 
the investment.  Section 227.303(b) is the key provision implementing the 
Staff’s self-certification standard, because it requires only that an 
intermediary “have a reasonable basis for believing that the investor satisfies 
the investment limitations” established by § 4(a)(6)(B) of the 1933 Act, and 
that, crucially, the intermediary can establish such reasonable basis belief by 
relying on the investor’s representations.230  These two provisions combined, 
then, allow for an issuer to rely on the assurances that its investors provide to 
the intermediary in order to retain the exemption, even if the investor 
misleads the intermediary and exceeds his income-based or aggregate 
investment limitations. 
One reason the SEC Staff found persuasive in reaching its conclusion that 
a self-verification standard is the most appropriate is that, “it would be 
difficult for intermediaries to monitor or independently verify whether each 
investor remains within his or her investment limits for each particular 
offering in which he or she intends to participate.”231  The Staff pointed to 
three comment letters complaining about this issue.232  One letter said that 
“unless the SEC offers some sort of very simple clearinghouse for tracking 
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investors nationwide, I think a portal can’t be expected to track investments 
made on other, competing portals.”233  However, another source, University 
of Colorado Professor Schwartz’s comment letter, described the 
CROWDFUND Act’s annual investment cap as a bedrock statutory 
protection for crowdfunding investors,234  arguing that: 
It may not be enough, for instance, for intermediaries to simply 
ask investors whether they have reached their annual limit and 
leave it at that, as crowdfunding investors might not remember or 
keep records of their past investments. Nor can intermediaries rely 
solely on their own internal records, as the cap is an aggregate one 
for all crowdfunding securities purchased on any platform and 
from any issuer. How exactly to regulate intermediaries’ policing 
of the annual cap is a difficult and complex matter that deserves 
careful attention by the SEC. Modern information technology may 
make it possible to enforce the cap at very low cost, even across 
different crowdfunding platforms. But even if the cost of 
effectively enforcing this cap turns out to be a bit high, it is 
probably worth it, because the whole statutory scheme depends on 
it.235 
Given these observations, it may come as a surprise to the Professor that 
the main takeaway the SEC drew from his comment letter was that, because 
“it will be difficult” for intermediaries to track investor activity with various 
other portals, a self-certification standard is therefore the best option.236  
Indeed, he seemed to argue the opposite.237  The third source wrote: “For all 
the brokers and funding portals to know this [aggregate investment] 
information, the Commission would have to collect this data and maintain it, 
on a real-time basis, for electronic access and search by brokers and funding 
portals.”238 
 
 233. Letter from Michael Mace, CEO of Cera Technology to SEC and Comment on 
SEC Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III, at 2 (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-10.pdf. 
 234. Letter from Andrew A. Schwartz, Associate Professor of Law at University of 
Colorado, to SEC and Comment on Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III 
(Jun. 13, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-240.pdf 
(excerpting his own law review article as a response: Keep it Light, Chairman White: 
SEC Rulemaking Under the CROWDFUND Act, 66 VAND. L. REV. 43 (2013)). 
 235. Id. 
 236. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,469. 
 237. Schwartz, Keep it Light, supra note 234, at 59.  
 238. Letter from Marshall Neel, Esq., Co-Founder of Crowdfunding Offerings, Ltd., 
to SEC and Comment on Regulatory Initiatives Under JOBS Act: Title III, (May 11, 
2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-60.htm.  
170 The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. XXX:1 
The SEC concedes that relying on a centralized database could “help 
provide an intermediary with a reasonable basis for a conclusion” that an 
investor is qualified, but notes that no such database currently exists.239  
Instead, the Staff seems to envision a “check the box” system where 
intermediaries create the functionality on their websites prompting investors 
to disclose their annual income, net worth, and their total investments in 
other intermediary platforms over the past 12 months.240  Unless the 
intermediary had information within its control, like for instance, that 
particular investor’s investment levels in another issuer on the platform, the 
intermediary will have satisfied its statutory burden by relying on the 
assurances of investors. 
2. Intermediaries May Be Liable for Fraud Committed by Issuers. 
The SEC took a significant position on the issue of intermediary liability 
under the CROWDFUND Act that is worth noting.  Section 4A(c)(3) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 now defines, for purposes of liability under Section 
4A generally, an issuer as any “person who offers or sells the security in 
such offering.”241  Section 4A(c)(1)(A) permits an investor to bring an action 
against “an issuer” to recover consideration paid for a crowdfunding-exempt 
security or for damages if the issuer make an untrue statement of material 
fact or omitted a material fact required in order to make the statements not 
misleading.242  The SEC staff found that, on the basis of the definition found 
in section 4A(c)(3), “it appears likely that intermediaries, including funding 
portals, would be considered issuers for purposes of this liability 
provision.”243 Thus, the SEC Staff seems to suggest that if a startup 
company provides an intermediary/funding portal with materially false 
offering documents and then disappears with investors’ money, then the 
investor could bring an action against the other “issuer” involved—the 
intermediary.244  The Staff hints that liability for making an untrue statement 
of material fact would be implicated only if the portal failed to conduct an 
adequate review of the offering documents to uncover the fraud, but it is 
unclear if the mere posting of fraudulent documents would alone implicate 
the liability section. 
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C. Self-Verification: Advantages and Disadvantages of Relying on Investor 
Assurances. 
The Commission took a hands-off approach to both the single-issuer 
investment limits found in section 4(6) and the aggregate investment limits 
compelled by section 4A(a)(8), as it did in the August 2012 Proposed Rule 
lifting the general solicitation ban.  The SEC proposes that issuers and 
intermediaries can depend on the voluntary disclosure by the investors of 
their income and net worth and aggregate investment levels.245  This result 
was likely a relief to intermediaries who may have feared the prospect of 
having to independently verify the total purchases of a given investor 
through other funding portals.246  However, since issuers are relying on the 
methods of intermediaries, who are in turn relying on the assurances of 
investors, it is worth considering whether this “trust me” structure satisfies 
the Congressional intent of the investment limitations, and whether the risks 
of self-certification are too high or uncertain. 
1. Does Self-Certification Satisfy Congressional Intent? 
A self-certification method to satisfy the aggregate investment levels, 
where an intermediary trusts the word of the investors regarding their 
investments with other funding portals, arguably does not capture the spirit 
of Congress’s inclusion of the word “ensure.”247  Senator Merkley outlined 
clearly that individual and aggregate caps serve as key investor protection 
measures in the CROWDFUND Act.248  He said in July 2012: “Without 
aggregate caps, someone could in theory max out a per-company investment 
in a single company and then repeat that bet ten, a hundred, or a thousand 
times, perhaps unintentionally wiping out their entire savings.”249  Sen. 
Merkley referred to the single-issuer investment limit as “an important 
investor protection” for low-income earners, and warned against adopting a 
“checking a box” method in order to “protect less sophisticated investors 
from opting into the higher limits accidentally or due to potentially 
misleading promptings from a less scrupulous intermediary.”250 
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In fact, statutory provisions that were part of the original House versions 
of the crowdfunding exemption allowing for an issuer or intermediary to rely 
on investor certifications as to annual income251 were removed from the 
Senate versions.  The House bills stated: “For purposes of section 4(6), an 
issuer or intermediary may rely on certifications as to annual income 
provided by the person to whom the securities are sold to verify the 
investor’s in come.”252  Since the House bill contained no aggregate caps,253 
there was no corresponding language permitting an intermediary to rely on 
an investor’s assurances regarding crowdfunding investments through other 
portals. 
On March 21, 2012, Majority Leader Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) agreed 
to allow an amendment to replace the House crowdfunding bill contained in 
the JOBS ACT, saying: 
This amendment will ensure that watchdogs are in place to protect 
the small investors and their money from fraudulent companies 
and abuse of the system. People are lurking out there waiting for 
ways to cheat. I am sorry, but it is true. These are people who are 
either amoral or immoral, looking for opportunities to make 
money. . . . It is an important amendment, and it is so important to 
improving this bill.254 
The next day, when the JOBS Act came to the floor of the U.S. Senate, 
Senators Merkley, Brown, and Bennet introduced Senate Amendment 
1884255 to replace Congressman McHenry’s crowdfunding language,256 the 
latter of which allowed for self-verification.  Sen. Merkley did not list the 
self-certification language as one of the seven key distinctions that he 
outlined between his amendment and the House bill.257  However, the 
Senator did note that the House version contained “no aggregate caps,” 
meaning that “a person could lose their entire life savings in one fell 
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swoop.”258  He said the Senate version set aggregate caps “so we don’t end 
up with folks who are on public services because they were swindled out of 
everything they had.”259  The day of the vote, Sen. Merkley described the 
House bill as “a pathway to predatory scams” because of lack of issuer 
transparency and it “allows companies to hire people to pump the stocks.”260  
Senate Amendment 1884 passed 64-35.261  Thus, the House crowdfunding 
bill’s self-certification language was explicitly omitted in the final Senate 
bill that was signed into law. 
Although the self-verification standard for annual income was not 
discussed at length on the Senate floor, Sen. Merkley certainly did not seem 
to contemplate self-verification as an option.  In addition to discouraging a 
“check-the-box” approach to the single-issuer investment cap for those 
seeking to make larger investments, citing investor protection,262 Sen. 
Merkley stated: 
Some have expressed concern about how to implement the 
aggregate amounts across platforms.  A data sharing regime is one 
way to do that, but the SEC might also consider whether to pair it 
with a presumption that ordinary investors that remain within an 
amount below the default aggregate, for example $500, on any one 
platform are also presumed compliant across other unaffiliated 
platforms.  This streamlining may be particularly useful for those 
seeking to make small investments and for those that want to 
engage in community-based crowdfunding.263 
It seems fair to say that any sort of “data sharing regime” among the 
intermediaries resembles something more like a centralized database, or at 
the very least is clearly distinct from the permitting of investors to self-
certify as the SEC staff has proposed.  The Senator envisioned some degree 
of a heightened duty on behalf of the intermediaries, beyond the mere 
assurances of investors. 
Further, consider the similarities between Title II and Title III of the JOBS 
Act.  As stated previously, Title II of the JOBS Act requires issuers to “take 
reasonable steps to verify” that purchasers are accredited investors,264 while 
Title III requires that intermediaries “make such efforts as the Commission 
determines appropriate, by rule, to ensure” that investors do not exceed their 
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limits.265  The requirement that intermediaries “ensure” that aggregate 
investment limits are not exceeded is analogous to the burden on issuers 
taking advantage of the general solicitation rule to take reasonable steps to 
ensure that purchasers are accredited.266  One wonders why the SEC had not 
considered the statutory burdens—one on issuers to “verify” that purchasers 
are accredited for the sake of the new general solicitation exemption, and the 
other on intermediaries to “ensure” investor qualification for the 
crowdfunding exemption—to be essentially the same. 
2. Investor Risk. 
It is simple to overstate the worries of self-certification.  After all, 
investors are their own best advocates, and are responsible for their own 
decisions with their money.  However, at the very least the SEC should craft 
a rule that minimizes intermediary uncertainty and investor risk.  The hands-
off approach to intermediary enforcement is understandable, but it carries 
risks that the financial incentives of self-verification harms, if not erases, the 
intent of the investment limitations as a meaningful investor protection 
measure.  The worry is that there could be a cascade of misrepresentations 
by investors, intentional or not, that could tarnish the marketplace with 
stories of low-income earners losing more than they should have had 
invested. 
It seems that self-certification could carry with it a predictable unchecked 
chain of incentives that has produced undesirable market outcomes in 
similar contexts.267  Consider, for example, the role that the mortgage 
servicing industry played in the housing bubble precipitating the 2008-2009 
financial crisis, where economic incentives and information gaps in the 
securitization market facilitated collusion among loan officers and fraud 
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among homeowners.268  Here, optimistic crowdfunding investors may 
attempt to maximize their investment and expected return by 
misrepresenting their income and/or crowdfunding aggregate investment 
levels with other funding portals to a third party validator,269 just as 
unqualified aspiring homeowners did during the housing bubble.270  
Meanwhile, intermediaries could insulate themselves from liability by 
arguing that they fulfilled their obligation by reasonably relying on third 
party validators, which presumably would earn fees for their services, to 
“ensure” that aggregate investor limits were being followed.  Similarly, a 
lender (i.e. the third party validator) who originates a mortgage earns a 
commission for each sale but lacks a long-term stake in whether the 
mortgage is paid, “beyond the lender’s own business reputation,” and the 
firm packaging the mortgages into mortgage-backed securities (i.e. the 
intermediary) also lacks the financial stake of the purchaser (the issuer).271  
Everyone seems to win—the loan applicant gets a home, the crowdfunding 
investor a stake in the issuer’s company—but, if both were unqualified from 
the start, the result is a foreclosed home or a broke investor (and potentially 
lost crowdfunding exemption for the issuer, if the single-issuer limit is 
breached).272 
3. Market Uncertainty. 
Although self-verification is a more workable standard for intermediaries, 
it arguably comes at the cost of not only increased investor risk but also 
market uncertainty.  For instance, some have argued that self-supplied 
income information could “be intentionally or unintentionally incorrect.”273  
Could investors have a claim against intermediaries for not failing to 
“ensure” compliance with investment limit overall, even if the investor 
misrepresented his income or net worth?  The SEC staff does not 
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forthrightly address the potential for investor misrepresentation in the 
Proposed Crowdfunding Rule,274 but stated that “[t]he intermediary could 
not rely on an investor’s representations if the intermediary had reason to 
question the reliability of the representation.”275  In other words, if an 
investor had already purchased Section 4(a)(6)-exempt crowdfunding 
securities through that intermediary, then it would not be reasonable for the 
intermediary to fail to track or otherwise ignore that amount purchased for 
purposes of other crowdfunding investments; the intermediaries are expected 
to reasonably track investor activity on their own internal systems.276  
Regardless, courts and the Enforcement Division of the SEC is unlikely to 
be sympathetic to actions by investors against intermediaries for damages or 
rescission where the investors made misrepresentations.  Analogous 
circumstances exist where investors have claimed to have been accredited at 
the time of transactions but subsequently disavowed those assurances in 
order to sue under the federal securities laws, and federal courts have been 
unsympathetic.277 
Additionally, an issuer loses the crowdfunding exemption for the entire 
equity or debt offering in the event that an intermediary fails to adequately 
ensure that a lone investor stays within his aggregate investment limit.  In 
that case, is there liability of the intermediary to the issuer?   
It is unclear, but the chief concern is not necessarily the issue of liability 
for fraud, but rather that investor misrepresentations of their qualifications 
could pervade the business.  Lack of adequate enforcement of investor 
qualifications could undermine the statute’s purpose by deteriorating 
investor confidence in small issuers.  Some have noted that “a self-certified 
income standard is essentially the same as no standard at all,” and the same 
logic can be applied to aggregate investment levels.278   
In any case, there is certainly the potential that the SEC Staff may 
reconsider its proposed rules in light of responses it receives throughout the 
comment period.  As discussed above, the SEC originally had proposed a 
similarly hands-off approach to its first general solicitation proposal with 
respect to an investor’s status as an accredited investor.279  The usefulness of 
 
 274. 78 Fed. Reg. 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 54,464 (citing Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256 
(6th Cir. 1991), Goodwin Props., LLC v. Acadia Group, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9975 (D. Me. 2001), and Faye L. Roth Revocable Trust v. UBS Painewebber Inc., 323 F. 
Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2004)). 
 278. Bradford, Crowdfunding, supra note 50, at 128. 
 279. Sara Hanks, Crowdcheck.com Memo, New Rule 506(c): General Solicitation in 
Regulation D Offerings, (Sept. 5, 2012) (“The SEC declined to specify even a non-
 
2013] Crowdfunding For Biotechs and the SEC’s Rule Proposal 177 
a facts and circumstances approach was questioned by some securities law 
practitioners as an ambiguous standard and too vague to be effective,280 so 
the SEC responded with a non-exclusive list of verification methods in its 
final rule.  Hopefully the Staff will respond to similar concerns of 
misrepresentations by crowdfunding investors in its final rule by suggesting 
that: the questions asked of investors by intermediaries about net worth, 
income, and aggregate investments be sufficiently detailed; that investor 
responses be accompanied by a sworn pledge of truthfulness; and that 
intermediaries disclose the potential for investor liability for untruthfulness 
(in, for instance, an administrative action by the SEC). 
D. SEC Rejects Calls for a Centralized Database, Which Would Be Safest, 
But Potentially Cost-Prohibitive Option to Enforce Aggregate Investment 
Limit. 
At the end of the day, the only way for an intermediary truly to “ensure” 
investor compliance would be to create a “central recordkeeping system” 
that all intermediaries could share.281  Such a centralized system could 
ideally be created and staffed by either the Commission itself282 or some 
(sole) third party verification service with the blessing of the SEC.  This was 
the path recommended by the Massachusetts state-level securities 
regulator283 and others.  Before the passage of the JOBS Act, one commenter 
outlined his vision for an SEC-run crowdfunding regime this way: 
Under such a setup, the SEC would own the central database of 
crowdfunding offerers, investors, and transactions. The SEC 
would therefore have the identities, financial account info, digital 
signatures, etc. of all market participants, and would initiate all 
movements of funds through its own system. This would grant the 
SEC full knowledge of and control over this market, allowing it to 
program red flags, investigate abuses, and shut down transactions 
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and users as needed, without approvals or cooperation from any 
other entity.284 
A centralized system would benefit intermediaries because a single, 
integrated database could contain both verifiable proof of investor income 
and net worth (i.e. federal tax returns) and investor investment status with 
other intermediaries in a form accessible to the multitude285 of 
intermediaries.286  In 2012, there were indications that the SEC was “leaning 
towards the use of a central database for verifying aggregate annual 
investment amounts instead of taking the investor’s word for it,”287 so 
perhaps the debate is still alive among the Staff. 
Given the other options, a non-profit, government-run clearinghouse could 
eliminate the risks of various market participants competing for customers 
and information.  The existence of various unknown verification services 
across the spectrum of crowdfunding288 could serve as a deterrent to investor 
participation because of a lack of trust.  From an investor’s perspective, if all 
that is known about an issuer is that which can only be read in cyberspace on 
an intermediary’s social media platform, providing a new third party 
sensitive documents demonstrating proof of income or about their 
crowdfunding investments may pose a risk outweighing potential investment 
returns.  The Commission should aim to make crowdfunding easier and less 
risky for investors, not riskier and unpredictable.  A central database, for 
income verification at least, may be more efficient anyway.  If federal tax 
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returns were used to verify income levels, for example, a federal agency is 
likely to have an easier time partnering with the Internal Revenue Service to 
retrieve such information.289  Consider, for instance, that the Department of 
Education partners with the Internal Revenue Service to offer the upload of 
federal tax information to streamline the Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid (“FAFSA”).290 
It may be true, however, that a centralized database—at least a taxpayer-
funded one—is likely cost prohibitive.291  Consider that, when asked 
whether it possessed a list of accredited investors in the U.S., the SEC told 
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) that it did not because, in 
the words of the GAO, “maintaining such a list would be impractical 
because there are so many accredited investors and could raise privacy 
concerns.”292  Further, even if “maintaining such a list were possible, the 
costs of doing so would likely outweigh the benefits.”293  Surely a list of 
retail investors would be much larger than one of accredited investors, 
suggesting that there is little hope for a centralized database to track investor 
information. 
Regardless, as stated above, the SEC Staff has thus far been unwilling to 
publicly entertain the idea of creating an in-house system, and has rejected 
calls for creating such a centralized database.294  The SEC Staff said in the 
Proposed Crowdfunding Rule that “[w]hile the proposed rules would permit 
reliance on a centralized database providing information about particular 
 
  289.    White, supra note 266 (suggesting “the SEC was leaning towards the use of a 
central database for verifying aggregate annual investment amounts instead of taking the 
investor’s word for it” at a June 2012 rulemaking meeting). Freeman White is CEO of 
Launcht, a crowd-funding website for “socially responsible startups.”).  
 290. FED. STUDENT AID, OFFICE OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., search results for “IRS,” 
IRS Data Retrieval Tool, http://www.fafsa.ed.gov/help/irshlp9.htm (stating that “[t]he 
IRS Data Retrieval Tool allows students and parents to access the IRS tax return 
information . . . and transfer the data directly into their FAFSA from the IRS Web site”). 
 291. See Bradford, Promise Unfulfilled, 40 SEC. REG. L. J. at 202 (2012) (describing “a 
central recordkeeping system” for aggregate investment enforcement as cost prohibitive). 
 292. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-640, ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA FOR 
QUALIFYING AS AN ACCREDITED INVESTOR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED 17 (July 2013), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655963.pdf. 
 293. Id. 
 294. 78 Fed. Reg. 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013) (citing “Spinrad Letter 1” which argued that 
“[a] centralized database approach would make such aggregate checks very simple. . . . 
[S]uch an approach could be self-funding . . . through the SEC’s taking a small fee from 
each transaction.”); see also Letter from Paul Spinrad to SEC and Comment on 
Regulatory Initiative Under JOBS Act: Title III (Jul. 26, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iii/jobstitleiii-114.pdf.  
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investors, if it could help provide an intermediary with a reasonable basis for 
a conclusion, we understand that none currently exists.”295   
Perhaps another option for a central database would be a quasi-
governmental organization funded in part by fees from intermediaries and 
issuers.  It is true that this would only further burden the nascent industry 
with higher costs, so perhaps some sort of public-private partnership or 
coordination with FINRA could be a viable option. 
E. Multiple Verification Services Could Introduce Economic 
Competitiveness, But May Complicate Information-Sharing. 
Under another scenario, numerous third-party participants could compete 
in a sub-market for the business of intermediaries seeking investment 
information for potential crowdfunding investors.  This could decrease costs 
in the short-term.  However, competitors would need to cooperate and share 
very specific investment volume information (i.e. which investor is using 
which intermediary website and how much each person is investing).296  
When similar asymmetric relationships exist in a market, a single market 
player often emerges.  Consider economic developments in other Internet-
based markets where there existed a structural vacuum, such as PayPal’s role 
in the development of eBay or Verisign’s role in domain name registration. 
Verisign, for instance, is the world’s largest Internet domain name registry 
service and is also a publicly-traded company working in a partnership with 
the federal government.297  Verisign retains the right to control and charge 
fees for the ubiquitous “.com” website suffix under an agreement with the 
Department of Commerce.298  The advantages are that the government hands 
over technical implementation to the market, while the integrity of the 
registration process is streamlined and functional.  Verisign is required by 
federal regulators to obtain permission before raising prices to cover its 
security and stability costs.299  However, an antitrust case involving Verisign 
 
 295. 78 Fed. Reg. at 66,470 (Nov. 5, 2013). 
 296. At least one state securities regulator has acknowledged the necessity of 
information-sharing. Galvin Comment Letter to SEC, supra note 283, at 3 
(recommending that intermediaries be required to share information in order to “allow 
other intermediaries to check compliance with this [crowdfunding investment] limit.”). 
 297. Fitzgerald, Drew, Chaudhuri, Saabira, VeriSign Limited in Raising Domain 
Prices, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324705104578151071332357666.html. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Ted Bridis, VeriSign Is Allowed to Keep ‘.Com’ but Gives Up ‘.Org,’ WALL ST. 
J. (Mar. 1, 2001), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB986229873245168534.html (full text 
available also at Proquest) (stating that “[u]nder a 1999 agreement with the Clinton 
administration, VeriSign retained long-term management control over the Internet’s 
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outlines the disadvantages of this model: that overwhelming market 
dominance by a single player could lead to the undesirable externalities of 
monopolies, such as anti-competitiveness and monopolization charges by 
customers, even with the approval of a federal executive agency.300  In any 
case, this is only to suggest that perhaps the SEC should not be so dismissive 
of some sort of other model before accepting a self-certification standard for 
crowdfunding. 
F. Summary of Investment Limit Enforcement Options. 
Four basic options for enforcing the aggregate investment limits were 
proposed above: (1) investor self-certification, which is the current standard 
in the Proposed Crowdfunding Rule, (2) a government-conceived, taxpayer-
funded centralized database, (3) a private solution with multiple players, or 
(4) a private solution with one dominant provider with the blessing of the 
Commission.  Ideally, an SEC-run centralized database containing investor 
limits and income levels would solve the regulatory problem.  Intermediaries 
would be protected from risk by having the security of relying on the same 
clearing house, and the verification process itself could be more efficient if 
investors were entrusting their information with one party, the SEC, in a 
partnership with the IRS to retrieve federal tax returns of investors.  The 
obvious impediment is the cost to taxpayers. 
VII. CONCLUSION. 
Case law and SEC rulemakings have demonstrated time and again since 
the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 that the primary goal of federal 
 
master list of addresses only if it split the company by May 10.  That condition was 
fueled by concerns by regulators and rivals that VeriSign held unfair advantage by 
managing the master directory and also selling Web addresses.”). 
 300. See, e.g., Coal. for ICANN Transparency, Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 611 F.3d 495 
(9th Cir. 2010).  The 9th Circuit, in 2010, found that an organization of website owners, 
the Coalition for ICANN Transparency, Inc. (“CFIT”), challenging the pricing and 
implementation of the Internet domain name system (“DNS”) by the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) and Verisign, Inc. had stated a valid claim 
of conspiracy in restraint of trade and attempted monopolization under §§ 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  ICANN is the non-profit oversight body which oversees the DNS on 
behalf of the Department of Commerce.  Id. at 499.  In overturning a lower court’s Fed. 
Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim, Circuit Judge 
Schroeder stated that CFIT had validly alleged “that VeriSign’s predatory litigation 
activity was aimed at coercing ICANN to perpetuate VeriSign’s role as exclusive 
regulator of the .com domain name market by awarding VeriSign the 2006 .com 
Agreement without any competitive bidding, and by agreeing to the terms that favored 
VeriSign.” Id. at 506. 
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securities laws has been investor protection.  Congress and the Commission 
have struggled over the years to balance reasonable access to the financial 
markets and capital formation with this vital need to protect unsophisticated 
investors from fraud.  Congress articulated laudable goals with its passage of 
the CROWDFUND Act: an alternative source of capital formation for 
entrepreneurs and increased access to the equity markets for ordinary 
Americans.  The President downplayed “laws that are eight decades old,” 
which he said prevent ordinary Americans from participating in capital 
markets, calling the bill a “game changer.”301 
The Comment has mapped out how there are useful small issuer 
exemptions already on the books, but that crowdfunding does have the 
potential to transform the manner in which startups form capital, especially 
in the biotechnology industry, chiefly because of the personal stake investors 
will have in seeking out medical solutions through social media.  However, 
crowdfunding efforts by life sciences and biotechnology startups may 
produce a toxic combination of bad actors and particularly hopeful 
unsophisticated investors.  So, did Congress and the SEC ignore decades of 
evidence that fraud pervades the securities marketplace, and will the new 
crowdfunding exemption usher in a new wave of boiler room schemes and 
pump-and-dump penny stock scandals? 
Perhaps.  Congress specifically enacted measures to mitigate against these 
very real risks.  The potential extension of liability to intermediaries for 
materially false representations made by underlying issuers may serve as a 
meaningful backstop against fraud.  However, such liability still presumes 
that investors possess the means, willingness, and capacity to file civil 
actions against scam artists.  The chief investor protection measures in the 
CROWDFUND Act are the single-issuer and aggregate investment limits.  
As Senator Merkley articulated, these are the provisions that prevent an 
elderly American on a fixed income from losing his whole life savings by 
“investing” in some charlatan’s false Internet promise. 
According to the Proposed Crowdfunding Rule, the SEC staff considers 
self-certification by investors to be the most realistic option for compliance 
with these requirements, in part because it would be just too difficult for 
various intermediaries to track aggregate investment activity on multiple 
other funding portals nationwide.  However, mere reliance on investors 
undermines the Congressional intent of the aggregate investment limits.  The 
versions of the JOBS Act that contained self-verification, which originated 
in the House of Representatives, were rejected by the Senate.  The SEC thus 
far has failed to note this fact.  Reliance on investors may come at a high 
 
 301. President Obama’s Remarks on Signing the JOBS Act, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1-2 (Apr. 5, 2012), 2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. S4.  
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cost of market uncertainty and increased risk that crowdfunding as a capital 
formation strategy may not come to fruition.  Both of these possibilities 
should be taken more seriously. 
A third-party verification regime overseen by the SEC or FINRA would 
provide the safest protection from fraudsters and reduce risks of liability for 
funding portals.  It could also provide a stable and trusted set of custodians 
for investors’ financial information.  The SEC’s Proposed Crowdfunding 
Rule fails to adequately contemplate the establishment of a centralized 
clearing house to verify investor qualifications or even some sort of role for 
third party verification services.  The lack of imagination and discussion in 
the proposed rule release is not surprising, given that the SEC staff is likely 
eagerly awaiting critical feedback from the crowdfunding and investing 
communities to incorporate more data and further develop the final rule. 
However, the fact remains that self-verification will likely result in 
inadequate compliance with the statutory limits.  Self-certification does not 
align with the Congressional intent behind the statutory limits, and is likely 
to behave as essentially a non-standard.  This may dash the hopes that young 
biotechnology startups have for equity crowdfunding as a meaningful capital 
formation tool moving forward. Entrepreneurs, funding portals, and potential 
crowdfunding investors should request that the SEC explain more fully how 
unfeasible it would be to, at minimum, require that intermediaries verify 
investor income or net worth when investors try to invest above a certain 
threshold.  Further, absent establishing its own central database, creating one 
at FINRA, or developing a registration system for third party verification 
services, the SEC should at least require intermediaries to share aggregate 
investment information with each other in order to facilitate meaningful 
compliance with intermediaries’ statutory mandate to “ensure” aggregate 
limits.302   
 
 
 302. Like, for instance, in the same manner in which Secretary Galvin advocates that 
intermediaries should be “required” to share information.  Galvin Comment Letter to 
SEC, supra note 283 (recommending that intermediaries be required to share 
information). 
